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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CREDIT 
CARD INDUSTRY: FEDERAL 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS 
John C. Weistart'-1 
!. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CREDIT CARD PROBLEM 
A. The Expansion of Credit Card Markets 
CREDIT cards have been used as a means of facilitating delayed-payment purchases since early in this century. The first credit 
card systems were operated by retailers and service organizations in 
connection with the merchandising of their products. While such 
programs were used in local markets by department stores,1 oil com-
panies were the first issuers to recognize the potential of credit card 
plans in larger geographical areas.2 In the early 1950's a new phase 
in credit card development evolved with the emergence of firms en-
gaging solely in the extension of credit. These firms-Diners' Club, 
American Express, and Hilton Credit Corporation with its Carte 
Blanche system-sold no merchandise, but rather enlisted a nation-
wide system of retail, service, and travel establishments to make 
credit sales to their cardholders. 8 The convenience of a single card 
that could be used for a variety of goods and services stimulated 
considerable consumer interest. Since each issuer of a multipurpose 
card potentially could reach a greater share of the credit card market, 
competition throughout the industry intensified. 
The efforts of the new, independent issuers were concentrated 
upon the solicitation of accounts, the evaluation of cardholder credit 
standing, and the development of centralized accounting and pro-
• Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1965, Illinois Wesleyan Univer-
sity; J.D. 1968, Duke University.-Ed. 
I. See Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL, 
U. L. REv. 218 (1967); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal 
Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 459, 460 (1960). The first credit devices used by local retailers 
were metal discs, termed credit coins, stamped with the name of the merchant and the 
customer's account number. See Jones Store v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, !)6 S.W.2d 681 
(1931); Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (1923); Wanamaker v, Chase, 81 
Pa. Super. 201 (1923); Wanamaker v. Mcgary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Philadelphia Mun. Ct, 
1915). The credit coin is discussed in Note, Implied Contract-Credit Coins and Cards-
Negotiability, 2 U. PilT. L. REv. 117 (1936). 
2. Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. IND, & CoM, L, 
REv. 485 (1967). The majority of the oil companies operated regionally in the 1920's, 
Reciprocal arrangements among companies were established in order to render their 
cards usable in areas of the country not serviced by the issuer. 
3. See generally id.; Davenport, supra note I, at 218-19; Comment, supra note 1, 
at 461-62; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, REPORT: BANK CREDIT• 
CARD AND CHECK-CREDIT PLANS 7 (1968) [hereinafter FED. REsERVE SYS, REP.]. 
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cessing systems. Since these functions are closely related to services 
provided by traditional financial institutions, it is not surprising 
that banks undertook to create their mm credit card systems. In 
addition, pressure £or bank entry into the industry resulted from the 
direct competition that nonbank issuers provided as their card-
holders substituted card credit £or short-term, high interest personal 
bank loans. Although a few small banks initiated credit card pro-
grams in the early 1950's,4 the first broad-based bank credit card 
systems appeared at the end of the decade with the establishment 
of the Bank of America system on the West Coast5 and the Chase 
Manhattan program in the Northeast. 6 
Despite the large scale of many systems sponsored by retailer~ 
issuers, credit cards attracted little legislative attention until the 
1960's. The early statutes were state enactments responsive to in-
dustry requests £or clarification of the applicability of criminal laws 
to credit card misuse.7 However, the industry itself, and the legal 
4. See Davenport, supra note 1, at 219 n.3; Robinson, New Developments in Retail 
Financing, 8 KAN. L. R.Ev. 554, 567 (1960). In 1951, the Franklin National Bank of 
Franklin Square, N.Y., became the first bank in the United States to adopt a credit 
card plan. By late 1958, approximately 100 smaller banks also had such programs. Wall 
St. J., Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 6. While most of these small banks entered the field with 
expectations of high profits, one half of them discontinued the service after a short 
period. FED. REsERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 7. 
5. See Davenport, supra note 1, at 219; Comment, supra note 1, at 462-63. While 
the Diners' Club, American Express and Carte Blanche cards attempted to attract the 
travel and entertainment charges of a professional and business clientele, the Bank of 
America plan was directed to more general consumer use. Bank card plans developed 
more rapidly on the West Coast than in other areas. By September 1967, nearly one 
half of the 400,000 business establishments honoring bank credit cards were in the 
San Francisco (Twelfth) Federal Reserve District. FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, 
at 9, 11. See also Johnston, Credit and Credit Cards, in BANKING MARKETS AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 252, 263 (1971). 
6. Following the lead of Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank began a credit 
card plan in late 1958. It did not achieve the rate of growth originally expected, in 
part due to the reluctance of large department stores in New York City to relinquish 
their already well-established credit systems. See FED. REsERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, 
at 7-8. As a result, in 1962 Chase Manhattan sold its credit card system, Uni-Serv Cor-
poration. It was eventually purchased by American Express in 1965. Chase Manhattan's 
expressed interest in re-entering the credit card industry with the purchase of Diners' 
Club in 1966 was discouraged when the Justice Department proposed to review the 
antitrust implications of the action. Wall St. J., May 24, 1966, at 32, cols. 1, 2-3. 
7. Once credit card misuse became of national importance, problems emerged when 
existing state criminal statutes were invoked against cardholders and unauthorized 
users. Since only a small charge was required to obtain the card, and the card was 
nontransferable by its terms, it seemed incongruous to value it by the number of 
purchases that could have been made with it. This raised problems in categorizing the 
use of a stolen credit card as grand or petit theft. Furthermore, when the credit card 
was signed by the user, it became a contract between the issuer and the user, which 
was thereafter incapable of being stolen. In addition, courts that first confronted the 
credit card problem were often confused as to whether the unauthorized use was lar-
ceny, forgery or obtaining property under false pretenses. See Note, Credit-Credit 
Cards-Civil and Criminal Liability for Unauthorized or Fraudulent Use, 35 NOTRE 
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relationships that it created, remained largely unregulated until 
adoption of amendments to the federal Truth-in-Lending Act in 
1970.8 
The growth of bank card systems during the mid-1960's primarily 
accounts for the change in legislative attitude. The Chase Manhattan 
and Bank of America card systems had established the compatability 
of credit card and banking practices, and the banking industry itself 
had developed a more aggressive, less risk-conscious outlook. Banks, 
once typified by their emphasis upon business accounts, devoted 
more attention to increasing their personal accounts through ex-
panded consumer services. In addition, banks already had associa-
tions that provided a firm foundation for launching a card program. 
Merchants who had accounts with a bank would be inclined to 
accept the bank's credit card in order to centralize their financial 
affairs. Similarly, individuals who had accounts with the bank were 
likely prospects as cardholders. A bank's reputation for financial 
stability and quality business management gave it an advantage 
over nonbanking firms in enlisting other merchants and cardholders. 
However, as banks readied to move into credit card plans, they 
realized that competition was likely to be severe. In large cities, 
there were usually several banks with resources sufficient to finance 
the initiation of a card system. At the same time, the older mer-
chandising credit plans of the oil companies and similar firms, faced 
with consumer resistance to the inconvenience of single-product 
cards, were expanded to allow multiple uses. Cards that formerly 
could be used only for petroleum products and automotive services 
and accessories were reformed to cover purchases in the broader 
travel and entertainment areas. 
B. The Chicago Experience 
The forces leading to expansion of the credit card industry in 
the mid-1960's were not sufficient to prompt legislation limiting the 
DAME LAw. 225, 235-40 (1960); Comment, Criminal Liability for the Unauthorized Use 
of a Credit Card, 7 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 158 (1962). This confusion led to state statutes 
that made it a crime to purchase goods by means of a credit card that had been 
stolen or bad expired. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-1901 (1964); FLA, STAT, ANN, 
§ 817.481 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.52, .545, .785 (Supp. 
1972); TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. §§ 1555b-c (Supp. 1972). See also Hearings on H.R. 12646 
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Scss. 39.54 (1967) 
[hereinafter 1967 House Hearings]. 
8. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. V, 84 Stat. 1126, amending Truth-in-
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-8lt (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 16020)-(o), 1642-44 
(1970), set out in note 34 infra). 
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growth of the industry. The number of issuers of multipurpose cards 
was still limited, and many segments of the population had not yet 
been attracted to credit card use. However, the efforts by new is-
suers to capture these lucrative markets produced conditions that 
ultimately prompted congressional concern. The event that provided 
the primary impetus for legislative inquiry into the credit card in-
dustry was the initiation of the Midwest Bank Card System by several 
Chicago banks in the latter part of 1966 and the early months of 
1967. 
The Midwest Bank Card System was a cooperative venture of 
five issuers for the exchange of charge receipts from credit card 
transactions.0 Although each issuer sought to enroll merchants into 
its particular plan, the card of any issuer in the system would be 
honored by all merchants who had agreed to participate in any one 
of the individual plans-an arrangement that substantially increased 
the convenience of each card. The profitability of each plan was 
dependent upon the issuer's ability to attract a large volume of card-
holders, many of whom would also be solicited by the other issuing 
banks in the system. 
The Chicago program was the first undertaken in a highly com-
petitive market. Banks in other cities had secured cardholders and 
participating merchants from their existing customers without sig-
nificant difficulty. However, since branch banking is prohibited by 
Illinois law, 1° Chicago banks realized that solicitations directed only 
to existing personal and merchant accounts would not produce the 
volume and geographical diversity necessary to secure maximum 
market impact in the metropolitan Chicago area; as a consequence, 
the issuers sought to increase the scope of their marketing operation 
beyond their existing customers. Cardholder-use patterns provided 
additional competitive pressure. Customer loyalty was perceived to 
be quite intense because once a cardholder had been indu~ed to use 
the card of a particular issuer, he was likely to remain with that plan 
despite the presence of competing programs.11 Thus, issuing banks in 
9. The banks in the Midwest Bank Card System were Continental Illinois National 
Bank and Trust Co., Harris Trust and Savings Bank, First National Bank of Chicago, 
Central National Bank, and a group of five smaller banks, which, under the direction 
of the Pullman Trust and Savings Bank, sponsored a single card. The Pullman group 
had originally initiated a card plan that was not part of the system. The Pullman card, 
the Illinois Bank Charge, was added to the Midwest Bank Card System shortly after 
the initial issuance of other members' cards. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1966, § 4, 
at 1, col. I. See also Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1966, § 3, at 9, col. 8. 
10. See ILL. CoNsr. art. 13, § 8; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16½, § 106 (Smith-Hurd 1972). 
11. Customer loyalty is fostered by the fact that the issuer-cardholder relationship 
will necessarily continue as long as a balance is outstanding in the card account. While 
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Chicago felt it necessary to enter the credit card market before com-
petitors' plans had become firmly established. Moreover, the Bank 
of America, which had originally concentrated its card plan in Cali-
fornia, had announced its intention to franchise its plan to banks 
across the country.12 To ensure that the Chicago market be preserved 
for local issuers, the banks sought to launch their plans before the 
BankAmericard had attracted significant numbers of merchants and 
cardholders. 
Among the marketing techniques utilized to reach customers 
quickly was the mailing of unsolicited cards to individuals whose 
names had been taken from mass-mailing lists.18 While the extent to 
which the lists were prescreened is disputed,14 the standards applied 
were clearly not as stringent as those used for small personal loans.11i 
The screening that was undertaken did not prevent multiple mail-
ings to an individual recipient by a single issuer. Similarly, the desire 
to reach persons other than those with an established relationship 
with the issuing bank resulted in mailings by several banks to a 
single recipient. 
The planning undertaken by the issuers was limited by the need 
to avoid delays in the initial solicitation of subscribers.16 As a result 
of this same pressure, mailings by more than one issuer were under-
taken simultaneously.17 Following extensive publicity, cards directed 
paying off an existing balance, the holder may make new purchases, which in turn 
extend his obligation to the issuer. Also, within the broad categories of card plans-
travel and entertainment cards, bank cards, and oil company cards-competing plans 
possess many of the same operational features, and one plan may offer few advantages 
over another. For example, the length of interest-free periods on revolving charges 
is often similar. In addition, plans that participate in interchanges such as the 
Master Charge system have the same relative number of merchant outlets. 
12. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1966, § 4, at 1, col. l; at 5, col. 2, 
13. Taylor, The Chicago Bank Credit Card Fiasco, BANKERS MAG., Winter 1968, at 49, 
50. In many cases where mass-mailing practices were employed, an acceptable credit 
card risk was an individual for whom no negative credit information had been 
reported. It appears that the usual sources of names were lists of customers of issuing 
banks. See generally FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 26-27. 
14. See the testimony of Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, Inc., in Hearings 
on H.R. 13244, H.R. 14361, and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operatiom 
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 91st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 91, 102 
(1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearings]; Taylor, supra note 13, at 50; FED. REsERVE 
SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 26-27. 
15. In some cases, cards were issued to minors. See note 22 infra and accompanying 
text. Many other recipients had no prior dealings with the issuing banks. FED, REsERVE 
SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 74. 
16. It has been reported that several issuers that had originally intended to 
distribute their cards in March 1967 were forced to accelerate their plans when the 
Pullman group announced its intention to begin mailing in November 1966. Wall St. J,, 
Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 6; at 15, col. 2. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1967, at 28, col. 2, 
17. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1966, § 3, at 7, col. 4. 
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to millions of individuals were placed with the Post Office.18 At the 
same time, the postal system was beginning to receive a significant 
amount of seasonal mail, and its usual work force had been supple-
mented by large numbers of temporary workers.19 
The competition among the issuers, their marketing techniques, 
and the timing of their mailings interacted in a manner that ad-
versely affected the image of both the Chicago banking industry and 
bank card plans generally. The distribution suggested a casualness 
that had not formerly been a part of the community image of the 
issuing banks. Some of the results were humorous. In a three-day 
period, one individual received seven cards from a single issuer,20 
and another reported receiving eighteen cards from the Chicago 
banks.21 Even young children were invited to utilize credit card ac-
counts established on their behalf.22 Other results were far more 
serious. There were thefts of large quantities of cards in the postal 
system and from recipients' mailboxes. While it appeared that the 
misappropriations were the result of an organized effort,23 this fact 
was never substantiated. It is clear, however, that significant numbers 
of persons were involved in the fraudulent use of the stolen cards-
occasionally with the knowing cooperation of merchants who had 
been solicited by the banks to participate in the plan.24 
When the scale of the fraudulent activity became 'apparent, the 
issuing banks moved quickly to minimize their losses. Merchants 
with high loss experiences were dropped from the plans. Other mer-
chants were required to telephone the issuing bank for approval of 
every sale.20 Three of the issuing banks eventually recalled all out-
18. One source estimates that cards were sent to 4 million families. Wall St. J., 
Jan. 17, 1967, at I, col. 6; at 15, col. 2. Continental llinois National Bank and Trust 
Co. alone distributed 1.5 million cards. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1966, § 3, at 7, col. 4. 
The cards were mailed first class without registration or other protection. 
19. FED. RF.sERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 75. 
20. Taylor, supra note 13, at 50. Banks using a number of mailing lists felt that 
cross-checking to avoid duplications would not be economically feasible. See FED. 
RESERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 74. 
21. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1967, at I, col. 6; at 15, col. 2. 
22. The names of minors were apparently secured from their savings and checking 
accounts. Instances of multiple receipts resulted when a recipient had several accounts 
with the issuing banks. FED. RESERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 74. 
23. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 50. 
24. Testimony of William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department, 
1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 68, 72. 
25. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 50. In card plans not experiencing the difficulties 
encountered in the first months of the Chicago plans, merchants generally need not 
secure issuer approval of sales below a stated amount. The typical floor limit for bank 
card plans is fifty dollars. See FED. RESERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 12; Clontz, Bank 
Credit Cards Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 BANK. L.J. 888, 898-99 (1970). 
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standing cards and reissued them only to those persons who were 
properly using their cards or who had submitted a written applica-
tion. Precautions in distribution, such as the use of registered mail, 
were initiated.26 
Despite these efforts, losses were estimated at six million dollars 
for the period from April to June 1967 alone.27 Bank card plans in 
all Federal Reserve Districts except the Chicago district recorded 
fraud and credit losses in the first six months of 1967 of 1.04 per cent 
of the amount of outstanding account balances. In that same period, 
Chicago issuers experienced a 5.73 per cent loss.28 The quarterly 
earnings of some of the issuing banks reflect the significant impact 
of these losses on the profitability of the firms.29 
26. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 75; Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1967, at 28, 
col. 2, 
27. Taylor, supra note 13, at 51. William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post 
Office Department, placed the loss at 12 million dollars by August 1967. 1970 House 
Hearings, supra note 14, at 241, 244. But see FED. REsERVE SYS. REP,, supra note 3, at 
75, concluding that these estimates arc high, since issuers continued to make recoveries, 
28. The extent of the fraud and credit losses of the Chicago banks is suggested by 
the following data from FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 31. While the Chicago 
district includes banks other than those involved in the Midwest Bank Card System, 
most of the activity in the district during the period is attributable to issuers in that 
system. The table expresses the amount of fraud and credit charge•offs in a six•month 
period as a percentage of the amounts outstanding on all cards within the district. 
FRAUD AND CREDIT LOSSES 
Charge-offs Amounts 
Federal Reserve Jan. 1 to Outstanding Loss 
District June 30, 1967 Sept. 30, 1967 Ratios 
(thousands of dollars) (per cent) 
Boston 263 21,800 1.21 
New York 332 64,800 .51 
Philadelphia 135 12,300 1.01 
Cleveland 403 26,900 1.41 
Richmond 204 28,200 .72 
Atlanta 193 30,600 .63 
St. Louis 16 12,300 ,Ill 
Minneapolis 100 
Kansas City 58 6,400 .91 
Dallas 151 8,100 1.86 
San Francisco 3495 295,300 1.18 
All Districts 
except Chicago 5250 506,800 1.0<! 
Chicago 7233 126,200 5.73 
All Districts 12483 633,000 1.97 
29. Taylor, supra note 13, at 51, reports 1967 second quarter earnings per share, in 
dollars, for the five largest banks in Chicago as follows: 
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One result of the initial losses in the Chicago program was that 
both the Post Office and card issuers modified their procedures for 
distributing unsolicited credit cards.80 While the Chicago experience 
was not repeated elsewhere, the resulting publicity underscored the 
potential abuse of unsolicited mailings. As other banks and nonbank 
issuers increased their reliance on this card distribution technique, 
public concern mounted. Although the adverse impact on profits pro-
vided the issuers with a strong incentive to curb the abuses of un-
solicited mailings, the broader issue of the impact of the credit card 
industry upon actual and potential cardholders had now come to 
public attention. 
C. ·The Federal Credit Card Statute 
The mass mailing of unsolicited cards was immediately subjected 
to criticism in Congress. The first proposal for regulation was intro-
duced in August 1967.81 The legislative controls initially proposed 
were directly responsive to bank efforts to establish and expand 
credit card programs as the proposed ban on unsolicited mailings 
extended only to these issuers.82 Subsequent bills recognized that 


















Of the five, First National, Continental, and Harris had issued credit cards, ,vhile 
American and Northern had not. Thus the three issuing banks all posted noticeable 
decreases in earnings. The Chairman of the Board at Continental identified "relatively 
high" fraud losses as a cause of the decrease in earnings. At Harris, a spokesman 
indicated that one reason for the reversal in the upward earnings trend of prior years 
was the "increased costs of our charge card plan." Chicago Tribune, July 6, 1967, § 3, 
at 7, col. 4. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1967, at 28, col. 2. 
30. See statement of William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Depart-
ment, 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 241, 244. An example of the security 
measures suggested for protection of unsolicited mailings is reprinted id. at 76. 
31. Representative Wright Patman introduced the first bill, H.R. 12646, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1967), and chaired the hearings before the House Committee on l3anking and 
Currency that considered his proposal and two related measures. See generally 1967 
House Hearings, supra note 7. 
32. See H.R. 12646, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The number of new entrants into 
the bank credit card field increased dramatically in the two-year period preceding the 
congressional inquiry into the credit card industry. In 1965, there were sixty-eight 
bank card plans in existence, only ten of which had been started later than 1959. But 
in 1966-1967, 129 new plans were initiated. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, 
at 9. 
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creasing frequency, and the proposals for regulation were expanded 
to include them.33 
The amendments to the Truth-in-Lending Act that were eventu-
ally adopted not only prohibited the distribution of unsolicited 
cards but also established a fifty dollar limitation on a cardholder's 
liability for unauthorized use of his card.34 These two controls touch 
33. See H.R. 15103, H.R. 13244, H.R. 14346, H.R. 14897, 91st Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess, 
(1969). See generally 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14. Several of the bills considered 
in the 1970 House hearings are summarized in Kennedy, The Plastic Jungle, 31 MoNT. 
L. REv. 29, 38-40 (1969). The measure that received the primary attention of the Senate 
and served as the basis of the legislation eventually enacted eJ{tended coverage to all 
issuers. See 5. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
34. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. V, 84 Stat. 1126. The amendments 
added six definitional provisions and new sections 132-34 to the Truth-in-Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 160I-8lt (1970), which now provides in relevant part: 
§ 1602. Definitions and rules of construction. 
G) The term "adequate notice," as used in section 1643 of this title, means a 
printed notice to a cardholder which sets forth the pertinent facts clearly and 
conspicuously so that a person against whom it is to operate could reasonably be 
expected to have noticed it and understood its meaning. Such notice may be given 
to a cardholder by printing the notice on any credit card, or on each periodic 
statement of account, issued to the cardholder, or by any other means reasonably 
assuring the receipt thereof by the cardholder. 
(k) The term "credit card" means any card, plate, coupon book or other credit 
device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services 
on credit. 
(l) The term "accepted credit card" means any credit card which the cardholder 
has requested and received or has signed or has used, or authorized another to use, 
for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit. 
(m) The term "cardholder" means any person to whom a credit card is issued 
or any person who has agreed with the card issuer to pay obligations arising from 
the issuance of a credit card to another person. 
(n) The term "card issuer" means any person who issues a credit card, or the 
agent of such person with respect to such card. 
(o) The term "unauthorized use," as used in section 1643 of this title, means a 
use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have 
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the card• 
holder receives no benefit. 
§ 1642. Issuance of credit cards. 
No credit card shall be issued except in response to a request or application 
therefor. This prohibition does not apply to the issuance of a credit card in 
renewal of, or in substitution for, an accepted credit card. 
§ 1643. Liability of holder of credit card. 
(a} Limits on liability. 
A cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card only if 
the card is an accepted credit card, the liability is not in excess of S50, the card 
issuer gives adequate notice to the cardholder of the potential liability, the card 
issuer has provided the cardholder with a self-addressed, prestamped notification 
to be mailed by the cardholder in the event of the loss or theft of the credit card, 
and the unauthorized use occurs before the cardholder has notified the card 
issuer that an unauthorized use of the credit card has occurred or may occur as 
the result of loss, theft, or otherwise. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no cardholdcr 
shall be liable for the unauthorized use of any credit card which was issued on 
or after the effective date of this section, and, after the expiration of twelve 
months following such effective date, no cardholder shall be liable for the un-
authorized use of any credit card regardless of the date of its issuance, unless 
(1) the conditions of liability specified in the preceding sentence arc met, and 
(2) the card issuer has provided a method whereby the user of such card can be 
identified as the person authorized to use it. For the purposes of this section, a 
cardholder notifies a card issuer by taking such steps as may be reasonably 
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upon aspects of credit cards that are not necessarily related. The 
provisions share, however, an underlying federal concern about the 
practices of an industry that has expanded in a relatively few years 
to the point where it directly affects the financial status of the 
majority of American families. This Article investigates the bases 
of these controls and predicts the likely impact of each upon the 
conditions they were designed to alleviate. 
II. THE PROHIBITION OF THE MAILING OF UNSOLICITED CARDS 
A. The Rationale of the Legislative Controls 
The legislative history of the amendments to the Truth-in-Lend-
ing Act indicates that congressional attention focused on the ban of 
unsolicited mailings. Early bills would have prohibited unsolicited 
mailings entirely,35 although a subsequently passed House version, 
not accepted by the Senate, authorized the Postal Service to adopt 
regulations to increase security in the handling of unsolicited cards 
in the mail.36 The measure that was eventually enacted originated 
from Senate Bill 721.37 In its original form, this bill did not directly 
required in the ordinary course of business to provide the card issuer with the 
pertinent information whether or not any particular officer, employee, or agent of 
the card issuer does in fact receive such information. 
(b) Burden of proof. 
In any action by a card issuer to enforce liability for the use of a credit card, 
the burden of proof is upon the card issuer to show that the use was authorized 
or, if the use was unauthorized, then the burden of proof is upon the card issuer 
to show that the conditions of liability for the unauthorized use of a credit card, 
as set forth in subsection (a) of this section, have been met. 
(c) Liability imposed by other laws or by agreement with issuer. 
Nothing in this section imposes liability upon a cardholder for the un-
authorized use of a credit card in excess of his liability for such use under other 
applicable law or under any agreement with the card issuer. 
(d) Exclusiveness of liability. 
Except as provided in this section, a cardholder incurs no liability from the 
unauthorized use of a credit card. 
§ 1644. Fraudulent use of credit card. 
Whoever, in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce, uses any 
counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained credit 
card to obtain goods or services, or both, having a retail value aggregating $5,000 
or more, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
35. See, e.g., H.R. 12646, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
36. H.R. 16542, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). After perfunctory debate, this measure 
was adopted without direct opposition, although there were sixty-four vote pairings. 
See 116 CoNG. REc. 30891-92 (1970). See generally H.R. REP. No. 974, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1970). 
37. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
A year before S. 721 was considered, the Senate held its initial hearings on the 
practices of the credit card industry. Begun in October 1968, this investigation was not 
directed toward a specific legislative proposal, but rather was a general inquiry into 
the impact of unsolicited mailings. Particular attention was given to a study of bank 
credit card systems prepared by the Federal Reserve System. See Hearings on Credit 
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regulate unsolicited cards, but rather delegated authority to the 
Federal Reserve Board under the Truth-in-Lending Act to formulate 
"minimum standards to be followed by all card issuers in checking 
the worthiness of prospective cardholders."88 In the hearings on the 
bill, however, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
expressed a reluctance to accept additional responsibilities in the 
area of consumer protection.39 To avoid the difficulties inherent 
in granting rule-making discretion to an unwilling agency, and to 
enhance the impact of the legislative control, the Committee amended 
the bill to impose an absolute ban on the distribution of unsolicited 
credit cards.40 
In contrast to the liability limitation provision, which proved to 
be noncontroversial, the prohibition of unsolicited mailings drew 
opposition from industry representatives and the Federal Reserve 
Board.41 While the congressional objectives in prohibiting unsolic-
Cards Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on BanMng 
and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (hereinafter 1968 Senate Hearings]. 
38. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969). 
39. Andrew F. Brimmer, a member of the Board of Governors, reiterated that 
group's position that the "assignment to the Board of wide-ranging duties in the 
general area of consumer protection would be inconsistent with effective performance 
of our primary duties in the field of monetary policy." Hearings on S. 721 Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 18 (1969) (hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings]. A similar view 
was expressed by William McChesney Martin, Jr., another member of the Board. Sec 
id. at 7, 8. 
In earlier House hearings, representatives of both the Federal Reserve Board and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had questioned the need for legislative 
control of unsolicited card distributions in light of the strong economic incentives for 
banks to correct their distribution practices in order to minimize losses. Sec 1967 House 
Hearings, supra note 7, at 7, 15-16 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System); id. at 19, 20 (statement of K. A. Randall, Chair-
man, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). See also 1968 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 37, at 2, 8 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer). 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra. See S. REP. No. 7.39, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970). After the Senate had adopted the amended S. 721, it received 
H.R. 16542 from the House. See note 36 supra. The Senate substituted the more 
stringent controls of S. 721 in the House measure and requested a conference on the 
modification. See 116 CoNc. REc. 31818-19 (1970). :Before this conference was held, the 
Senate received from the House an unrelated bill, H.R. 15073, dealing with record• 
keeping requirements for federally insured banks. In the course of its consideration of 
this bill, the Senate inserted the language of S. 721 and returned it to the House for 
conference. After the conference made minor modifications of the criminal liability 
provision of the bill, H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1970), the 
measure that originated as S. 721 was approved by the Senate, see 116 CONG. REc. 35943 
(1970) (conference report accepted), and by the House, see 116 CONG, REc. 36577 
(1970) (conference report accepted). 
41. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 118 (statement of James E. 
:Brown, Interbank Card Association); id. at 123, 125 (testimony of Edward J. McNeal, 
American Retail Federation); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 13, 14 (letter to 
Representative Nix from William McChesney Martin, Jr., Board of Governors, Federal 
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ited mailings were stated in various forms, the supporters of the 
enacted legislation opposed this card distribution technique because, 
in their view, the practice gave rise to four undesirable conditions. 
They felt that such mailings, by introducing millions of people to 
the convenience of credit card purchases stimulated consumer 
demand for credit and contributed to the inflationary tendencies 
of the nation's economy. Moreover, because the credit investigation 
that preceded the mailing of such cards was often superficial, it was 
believed that cards came into the hands of many persons incapable 
of containing the use of such cards within the limits of their personal 
budgets. Third, the mass-mailing technique increased the likelihood 
of criminal diversion of cards, which in tum increased the burden on 
law enforcement agencies. Finally, because the cards were sent to 
persons who had not requested them, the unsolicited distribution 
of cards was regarded as an invasion of privacy.42 
I. The Significance of Unsolicited Credit Cards 
in an Inflationary Economy 
The inflationary impact of credit cards allegedly manifested itself 
in several forms. The sponsors of the legislation often argued that 
credit cards provided a readily available form of credit that induced 
consumers to increase spending.43 The resulting demand for goods 
and services put pressure on an economy that, at the time of the 
emergence of bank-sponsored plans, was expanding at- a potentially 
inflationary rate.44 There were in fact significant increases in the 
amount of charges outstanding on all types of credit cards. In the 
two-year period from 1967 through 1969, outstanding card credit in-
creased by more than one third, or nearly four billion dollars.45 A 
Reserve System); id. at 91, 92 (testimony of Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, 
Inc.); id. at 162, 163 (testimony of John P. LaWare, Bank Card Committee, American 
Bankers Association). 
42. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 1-2 (statement of Senator 
Proxmire); id. at 8, 10 (statement of Representative Hanley); 1970 House Hearings, 
supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Representative Nix); 116 CONG. REc. 11828-30 (1970) 
(statement of Senator Proxmire); id. at 11831 (statement of Senator McIntyre); id. at 
30878-79 (statement of Representative Olsen). 
43. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 8, 9 (statement of Representa• 
tive Hanley); id. at 131, 132 (statement of Jerome R. Gulan, National Federation of 
Independent Businesses, Inc.); 116 CoNG. R.Ec. 11830 (1970) (statement of Senator 
Proxmire). 
44. The Federal Reserve Board, which was not resisting the proliferation of credit 
cards in the consumer credit sector, had undertaken efforts, such as raising the discount 
rate, to "soften" the demand for other forms of credit. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 
1968, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1968, § 3, at 1, col. 7. 
45. The Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Consumer Credit and 
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significant portion of this increase is attributable to the expansion 
of bank credit card plans. But, despite the vast amount of credit re-
sulting from credit card use,46 the relative importance of the contri-
bution of unsolicited cards to inflationary trends can be questioned. 
While the amount of card credit was undergoing significant increases, 
total consumer debt was increasing by greater amounts, indicating 
that expansion of consumer demand for credit was not a phenom-
enon attributable solely to credit cards.47 Moreover, the proportion 
of total consumer debt represented by card credit remained relatively 
small, accounting for 11.26 per cent of total debt at the end of 1967 
and 12.49 per cent two years later.48 Perhaps the most apparent defect 
Finances Section, has compiled figures for revolving credit plans, broken down by the 
various types of issuers, as follows: 
REvOLVING CREDIT PLANS 
(Amounts Outstanding in Billions of Dollars) 
Dec. 31, Dec. 31, Dec. 31, Dec. 31, 
Type of Credit 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Bank Credit Cards 
(excluding check-credit plans) 0.8 1.3 2.6 3.7 
Oil Companies 
(consumer portion only) 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 
Department Store Revolving Credit 3.5 3.7 4.2 4.6 
Retail Charge Accounts 5.9 6.5 6.7 6.9 
Travel &: Entertainment Cards 
(consumer portion only) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
All Others 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total 11.5 13.0 15.3 17.3 
\ 
Reported by Andrew F. Brimmer, Bank Credit Cards: The Record of Innovation and 
Growth (paper presented at the Annual Seminar of the Puerto Rican Bankers Assn., 
March 26, 1971) [hereinafter Brimmer Paper], on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
See also 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 31 (submission of Andrew F. Brimmer, 
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System); S. REP. No. 739, supra note 40, at 2, 
46. It is inaccurate to refer to the entire amount outstanding as "credit"; the 
portion of this amount that is paid off within one month more resembles a cash 
transaction. Hence, comparisons of this total amount to traditional forms of long-term 
consumer credit, such as automobile loans or other commercial paper, arc somewhat 
misleading. See Brandel &: Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 
MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1039, 1059-61 (1971). 
47. A comparison of total consumer credit and credit card credit in billions of 
dollars for the years 1967-1970 is presented below: 















Compare 57 FED. RF.s. BULL. A56 Only 1971), with note 45 supra. The growth of con• 
sumer debt during the past decade was phenomenal, rising from 56 billion dollars in 
1960 to more than twice that in 1970. 57 FED. RF.s. BULL., supra, at A56. 
48. 57 FED. RF.s. BULL., supra note 47, at A56. Those advocating controls c;o\\ld point 
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in the inflationary argument was the absence of any attempt to iden-
tify the relative impact of unsolicited cards. Even if card credit had 
inflationary ramifications, it was never proved that control of un-
solicited cards alone would have any appreciable impact on the 
growth of card usage. 
The analysis of the inflationary impact of cards also failed to 
evaluate the extent to which increases in card credit merely repre-
sented substitutions for more traditional forms of credit. A portion 
of the increase in credit card balances probably represents a move-
ment away from consumer credit in the form of short-term personal 
loans and individual charge accounts.49 In many other instances, 
credit cards were used as a substitute for cash.5° Concerned about 
the risk of carrying large amounts of cash, individuals-particularly 
those who traveled extensively-logically turned to credit cards. To 
the extent that charge balances are paid immediately upon billing, 
credit card usage does not necessarily increase either the extent of 
consumer buying or the amount of outstanding consumer credit. 
Because the merchant-cardholder agreement generally provided 
that merchants participating in independent plans would be reim-
bursed by issuers in an amount less than the total amount of the 
sale,61 Congress was also concerned that the merchant would pass 
this discount on to the consumer in the form of higher prices, a 
condition that added to existing inflationary trends. 52 The hearings 
include no serious attempt to provide an empirical basis for the 
to a significant growth in bank cards. On the implicit assumption that most of these 
were unsolicited, they argued that the growth of bank card usage evidenced inflationary 
pressures. The amount of credit outstanding on bank credit cards increased from 0.8 
billion dollars in 1967 to 2.6 billion dollars in 1969. See note 45 supra. However, com-
pared to a total consumer debt of 102 billion dollars in 1967 and 122.5 billion dollars in 
1969, this growth did not appear to have had a substantial impact on the growth 
of consumer credit. See note 47 supra. 
49. The confusion that existed with respect to the significance of credit card 
growth is illustrated by Senator Proxmire's analysis that "when you have $15 billion 
more of demand in our economy, ... it undoubtedly does have a significant effect on 
inflation, ••• " 116 CONG. R.Ec. 11830 (1970). This statement presumes that all card 
credit was "new" credit-that is, credit that would not otherwise have been demanded. 
50. See Brandel & Leonard, supra note 46, at 1039, 1059-61. The characterization of a 
credit card purchase as either a "cash" transaction or a "credit" transaction has 
important implications for the policy question whether the cardholder should be able 
to assert against the issuer defenses arising out of his transactions with a merchant. 
See generally id.; Note, Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, 81 
YALE L.J. 287 (1971). 
51. A sample merchant-issuer agreement is set out in Davenport, supra note 1, at 
248-51. 
52. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 11830 (1970) (statement of Senator McIntyre); 1969 
Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 75, 79 (statement of Professor Willier, National 
Consumer Law Center, Boston College). 
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validity of that analysis. Indeed, the significance of the discount was 
overstated. While some supporters of the legislation estimated the 
discount to be as high as seven per cent of the purchase price,li3 the 
figure more typically cited was five per cent.54 In fact, in most credit 
card transactions the discount was less than this. For example, while 
banks usually sought to secure a three per cent discount from re-
tailers other than petroleum dealers and service organizations,56 com-
petition among issuing banks sometimes drove the discount levels 
dmvn as low as one per cent.li6 Moreover, the payment of the dis-
count would not necessarily cause the merchant to raise his prices. 
In exchange for the discount, the issuer would assume the risk of 
nonpayment and the cost of maintaining the necessary accounting 
and collection systems; hence, the merchant was relieved of the costs 
associated with these activities. Merchants might also increase their 
sales as a result of participation in the plan, thereby offsetting any 
increase in costs caused by the discount.67 
It is not suggested that the inflationary implications of credit 
card usage can be disproved by this limited analysis. What is sug• 
gested, however, is that the congressional investigation of the impact 
of credit cards on inflation was inadequate. The presence of a sig-
nificant inflationary trend could not be attributed to credit cards, 
much less to unsolicited cards. This perceived danger resulting from 
unsolicited credit cards offers no persuasive justification for the 
statutory prohibition. 
2. The Impact on Personal Financial Integrity 
Another frequently stated concern of the sponsors of the credit 
card legislation was the impact that the mass distribution of cards 
had upon the ability of certain recipients to avoid assuming exces-
sive credit responsibilities.58 It was feared that credit cards were 
being sent to persons who were incapable of appreciating the obliga-
53. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 4, 6 (testimony of Representative 
Patman). 
54. 116 CONG. R.Ec. 11830 (1970) (statement of Senator Proxmire). 
55. See Wall St. J., May 24, 1966, at 32, col. 2. 
56. See Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1967, at I, col. 6; at 15, col. 2, reprinted in 1969 
Senate Hearings, supra note • , at 233, 235; Taylor, supra note 13, at 52, 
57. See Johnston, supra ~,ote 5, at 257; Brandel &: Leonard, supra note 46, at 
1040. If the issuers are SU(Cessful in enlisting a significant number of competing 
merchants, the competitive aC:vantage would be cancelled, undercutting the argument 
that the discount would be absorbed. 
58. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Representative 
Patten); 116 CONG. R.Ec. 11828 (1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). 
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tion that attended their use.59 The perceived consequence was disin-
tegration of personal financial stability and a concomitant increase 
in personal bankruptcies. Although the concern surfaced in both the 
House and Senate, it was most directly reflected by the legislation 
proposed in the latter. The House proposals generally regulated only 
the manner in which unsolicited cards were mailed and, thus, did 
nothing to ensure that mailings were not made to unqualified per-
sons. 60 On the other hand, the original Senate version of S. 721 
indicated a paramount concern for the impact of the cards on the 
recipients' credit standing. The rule-making authority proposed for 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System directed the 
Board to prescribe standards that would "protect consumers against 
over-extending themselves with credit obtained through the use of 
unsolicited credit cards .... "61 This provision was subsequently re-
placed by the absolute prohibition on unsolicited mailings, but the 
concern that prompted the original version continued to be ex-
pressed.62 
In attempting to quantify the adverse impact of uncontrolled 
extensions of credit, the sponsors relied heavily on testimony con-
cerning the increasing role of credit cards in personal bankruptcy 
proceedings.63 In 1967, the first year Congress investigated un-
solicited cards, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies surpassed 
190,000, culminating several years of significant increases.64 Answer-
ing inquiries from the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts about the significance of credit cards in recent bankruptcy 
cases, several bankruptcy referees indicated that debts incurred 
through the use of credit cards were appearing with unprecedented 
59. For example, a janitor earning $55 per week ran up debts totalling more than 
$3000, 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 36; a bankrupt with assets of $20 ran up 
debts of $11,178 on a worldwide tour, id. at 46; and an alcoholic ran up a liquor 
bill of $500 in a short period of time, 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 34. 
60: See H.R. 12646, H.R. 13600, H.R. 13796, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 
15103, H.R. 13244, H.R. 14346, H.R. 14897, 91st Cong., 1st&: 2d Sess. (1969). A measure 
eventually passed by the House, but not accepted in the Senate, merely directed the 
Postal Service to adopt regulations to control the manner in which unsolicited cards 
were mailed. See H.R. 16542, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also notes 35-36 supra and 
accompanying text. 
61. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(l) (1969). 
62. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 11841 (1970) (remarks of Senator Percy, who supported 
a more flexible standard of controlling the overextension of the consumer's credit). 
63. See statements of Royal E. Jackson, Chief of the Bankruptcy Division, Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts, in 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 30-61; 1969 
Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 43-61; 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 132-62. 
64. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 152 (statement of Royal E. Jackson, 
Chief of the Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). 
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frequency.65 One congressman, noting that the number of non-
business bankruptcies had more than doubled in two years, con-
cluded that "most, if indeed not all, of the increase . . . can be 
attributed to the indiscriminate and uncontrolled use of credit 
cards."66 
A closer examination suggests that this conclusion was unsup-
ported by the data presented by the referees. In the two years follow-
ing commencement of the congressional inquiry into the economic 
impact of credit cards, the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies de-
clined.67 Since credit card use was expanding in this period,08 the 
impact of credit cards on personal bankruptcies appears minimal. 
The increase in the number of bankruptcy filings prior to 1967 is 
more appropriately explained by its relationship to the significant 
growth of total consumer credit during that period.09 In addition, 
the responses of the bankruptcy referees were not overwhelmingly 
convincing. Most responses were not based on a systematic survey of 
pending cases, while in other responses, the data supplied did not 
suggest that credit cards were of noticeable importance.7° Further-
more, credit card debts owed to issuers were generally a relatively 
small proportion of the bankrupt's total indebtedness.71 Significantly, 
neither the responses of bankruptcy referees nor the testimony dur-
ing the hearings attempted to determine the extent to which credit 
card debts were substitutions for other forms of borrowing by bank-
rupts. While the data presented do suggest that other forms of credit 
65. In the Eastern District of Tennessee, where the most complete statistics were 
gathered, debts on bank cards were listed in 17 per cent of the wage-earner cases 
filed. The average indebtedness on these cards was $542, while the average total in-
debtedness of the bankrupts was $4200. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 48. 
66. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 237, 238 (testimony of Representative 
Charles Wilson). 
67. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 152. Royal E. Jackson, Chief of the 
Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, submitted the following 
















68, See note 45 supra, which illustrates the increase in credit card balances. See also 
note 48 supra. 
69. See generally Countryman, Proposed New Amendments for Chapter XIII, 22 
Bus. LAW. 1151 (1967). 
70. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 43-44 (letter from the Referee in 
Bankruptcy, Western District of Washington); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 
143-44 (letter from the Referee in Bankruptcy, Southern District of Ohio), 
71. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 41 (letter from the Referee in 
Bankruptcy, District of Minnesota); id. at 44-45 (letter from the Referee in Bankruptcy, 
Eastern District of Wisconsin). 
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might not have been available for some purchases made with credit 
cards, many items purchased on cards could have been financed by 
other means. On the basis of the evidence presented to Congress, 
it can only be said that the incidence of credit card debts revealed in 
bankruptcy proceedings increased in the few years preceding the 
initiation of the congressional inquiry. But because no attempt was 
made to quantify and analyze that increase, and since the years sam-
pled reflected only the early history of unsolicited mailings by banks, 
the adverse impact perceived by some provides an inadequate basis 
for generalization about subsequent experience. The testimony pre-
sented does not support the conclusion that a prohibition of unsolic-
ited mailings would have an appreciable impact on the frequency of 
nonbusiness bankruptcies. 
An additional factor that seemed to support the concern for 
the impact of credit cards upon personal financial integrity was the 
higher loss ratio experienced by banks on card credit than on other 
forms of consumer lending.72 The evidence available during the con-
gressional investigation was not unequivocal, for the delinquency 
rates under established card plans compared favorably with the 
experience of banks on other types of loans.73 But findings of the 
72. See S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). 
73. While limitations in available data preclude convincing generalization, some 
banks experienced relatively low delinquency rates. The delinquency experience of 
banks in the Federal Reserve Districts of New York and San Francisco in 1967 compare 
favorably with other types of loans. Banks in these districts experienced delinquencies 
of approximately 1.57 per cent of the dollar value of their customers' credit card 
transactions. FED. REsERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 32. By comparison, data reflecting 
the experience of all Federal Reserve banks indicate that 1.45 per cent of all regular 
installment loans were delinquent. Home appliance loans, a type of credit closely 
related to card credit, Johnston, supra note 5, at 256, were delinquent at the rate of 
2.19 per cent. Automobile and personal loans, the two other types of loans represented 
in the composite figure, were delinquent at the rates of 1.24 and 1.48 per cent, 
respectively. FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 32. Incomplete statistics from 
1966 suggested a similarly favorable comparison. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 
7, at 55 (testimony of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve 
System). 
The New York and San Francisco districts cover bank card plans that were 
relatively mature when the statistics were compiled. Available data indicate that losses 
experienced in a card plan decrease as the age of the plan increases. 
BANK CR.EDIT CARD Loss RATIOS BY LENGTH OF IssUER OPERATIONS 
Years in Operation 















This table indicates loss ratios rather than the delinquency rates discussed above. Data 
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Federal Reserve System made available after the close of legislative 
hearings do confirm that credit card losses are appreciably higher 
than those experienced with other forms of loans.74 Since many 
bank plans were initiated by unsolicited mailings, this form of card 
distribution seemed to be related to the higher default rate. Avail-
able data, however, does not confirm this relationship. Statistics on 
loss experiences in bank plans do not distinguish between solicited 
and unsolicited accounts. Furthermore, the difference in default 
rates between card credit and other forms of lending is more directly 
related to the nature of the credit than to the manner of its issuance. 
With other forms of credit, the lender can make an evaluation of the 
debtor's credit standing before the credit is used. The debtor's use 
of card credit, however, is not directly supervised on a transactional 
basis. Card credit, while typically subject to a credit limit, continues 
to be available despite changes in the borrower's financial position. 
The loss experience of card issuers has been significantly affected 
by changes in general economic conditions. The increased losses that 
issuers experienced in 1969 and 1970 are explained, in part, by the 
recession that was developing in that period. This condition pro-
duced dramatic increases in the delinquency rates suffered by issuers, 
an effect not limited to firms that relied heavily on unsolicited mail-
ings.75 While defaults in other types of consumer loans also are 
affected by deteriorating economic conditions, the impact on card 
credit is likely to be more pronounced because of the less direct 
supervision of such lending. Moreover, because the debtor often has 
greater control over the rate of his repayment of credit card account 
balances, other types of loans, particularly fixed-sum installment 
on the loss experience of bank credit cards does not distinguish between fraud losses 
and credit losses. Since losses due to fraud may be incurred through misuse by a person 
other than the cardholder, the stated loss experience is not a precise indicator of the 
extent to which individuals fail to meet their credit card obligations. Loss ratios and 
delinquency rates logically should, however, bear a closely proportional relationship, 
The delinquency rates of plans in some districts other than New York and San 
Francisco were unusually high. Banks in the Chicago area, for example, experienced a 
delinquency rate of 3.69 per cent. Rates in these areas are probably not representative 
of the likely long-term experience of issuing banks. See FED. R.EsERVE SYS. REP., supra 
note 3, Table SA at 32. 
74. As a percentage of year-end outstanding credit advances, charge-offs on bank 
credit cards among all members of the Federal Reserve System were 2.38 per cent in 
1969. The banks' loss experience worsened in 1970, as charge-offs amounted to 3.39 per 
cent. Losses on other types of consumer loans were significantly less. In 1969, for 
example, losses on personal loans were approximately 0.8 per cent of the outstanding 
advances. See Brimmer Paper, supra note 45, at 6-7. See also 1967 House Hearings, 
supra note 7, at 12. The higher charge-offs for bank credit cards may be due in part 
to the inclusion of fraud losses in the totals. See note 73 supra. 
75. The number of delinquencies in the accounts of the Diners' Club, which issues 
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obligations, are likely to be given priority as resources available to a 
debtor for repayment become strained. 
The legislative inquiry into the impact of credit cards gave par-
ticular attention to the numerous reports of personal financial diffi-
culties resulting from credit card use. A partial explanation for many 
of these experiences is found in the techniques used to develop 
credit card plans, particularly those initiated by banks. During the 
years immediately following initiation of a card plan, a bank often 
experiences a large loss rate;76 as the plan matures, losses decrease. 
Many of the publicized credit card abuses occurred during the 
period immediately following initiation of a plan and often involved 
cards that were sent following only limited credit investigations. 
While the rigor of an issuer's credit standards was increased as loss 
experiences became known, initially high personal default rates may 
be inherent in the system used for selecting participants in card plans. 
Issuers of card credit observe lower credit standards in an effort to 
achieve the volume of cardholders necessary to sustain a profitable 
program.77 Rather than relying solely on preissuance credit evalua-
tions, in many cases the issuer uses a cardholder's actual payment 
performance to determine his suitability as a credit risk.78 Through 
adequate control of the initial credit limit for cardholders with 
questionable credit ratings, the issuer can extend his plan to persons 
who might not meet more traditional credit standards, while never-
theless ensuring that losses will not exceed reasonable limits. 
This market-selection technique contributed to the congressional 
dissatisfaction with credit card plans, particularly those initiated by 
banks in the mid-1960's. The legislative history suggests that many 
congressmen felt that it was improper for issuers to induce an indi-
vidual to test his capacity to handle credit. It is doubtful, however, 
that the legislation ultimately adopted will substantially deter this 
technique.79 In those situations where the person requesting a card 
has completed an application, an issuer may continue to employ 
cards only in response to applications, doubled in the period from June 1969 to Decem-
ber 1970. See Ross, The Credit Card's Painful Coming-of-Age, FORTUNE, Oct. 1971, at 
108, 110. The charge-offs in bank credit cards mirrored this experience. See note 74 
supra. 
76. See note 73 supra. 
77. See Brandel &: Leonard, supra note 46, at 1036-37. 
78. Cf. 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 19 (testimony of Andrew F. Brimmer, 
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). 
79. Insofar as the prohibition of mailing unsolicited cards increases the cost of ini-
tiating new credit card plans, however, it will inhibit their creation altogether. See 
notes 107-08 infra and accompanying text. 
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limited preissuance credit-screening and choose instead to rely heav-
ily on the payment performance of the cardholder. The prohibition 
on unsolicited mailings, unlike the original version of S. 721 which 
would have ordered the Federal Reserve Board to establish mini-
mum credit standards, leaves the matter of credit evaluation to the 
issuer's discretion. The factor that operates to limit the level of risk 
an issuer will find acceptable-the threat of limited profitability-
is unaffected by the legislative prohibition of unsolicited mailings. 
3. Criminal Activity and Unsolicited Cards 
The generalized use of credit cards was accompanied by an in-
crease in criminal activity involving credit cards. Easily obtained by 
illicit means, credit cards were often accepted without corroborating 
identification by merchants who were assured of reimbursement by 
the issuer. A study undertaken by the Federal Reserve System indi-
cated that the huge losses suffered by issuers in Chicago were pri-
marily the result of fraudulent misuse by unintended recipients 
rather than overextension of credit to intended recipients. 80 The 
Post Office reported a dramatic increase in the number of prosecu-
tions arising from credit card thefts,81 and several well-publicized in-
stances of criminal misuse of credit cards were circulated while con-
gressional hearings were being conducted.82 This evidence prompted 
proponents of the federal legislation to suggest that federal controls 
were necessary in order to thwart criminal activity in credit cards.88 
A major deficiency in this analysis was the failure of Congress to 
recognize that card issuers had a significant financial incentive to 
develop distribution procedures that would minimize the incidence 
of card misuse. The Chicago experience and losses sustained by banks 
elsewhere suggest a relationship between mass mailings and theft;84 
80. See Fm. Rl!sERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 75. Statements of officials of the Chi• 
cago banks, although understandably guarded, also indicated the importance of fraud 
losses in the initially adverse experience of the Chicago issuers. See Chicago Tribune, 
July 6, 1967, § 3, at 7, col. 4. 
81. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 70. William J. Cotter, Chief Postal In-
spector, Post Office Department, testified that mail fraud investigations involving credit 
cards increased from 15 in 1964, to 360 in 1968, and to 762 in 1969, 
82. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 235, reprintitig Wall St. J., 
July 30, 1969, at 7, col. 4; id. at 236, reprinting Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1967, § F, 
at I, col. 4. 
83. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 8, 12 (statement of Representative Han-
ley); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Representative Nix); 116 
CONG. R.Ec. 11839 (1970) (statement of Senator Proxmire); id. at 30878-79 (statement of 
Representative Olsen). 
84. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 83-90 (testimony of Seymour Rotker, 
Executive Assistant to the District Attorney, Bronx, New York). 
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but because issuers bore the financial loss of misappropriation, it 
could be expected that they would develop more sound distribution 
techniques. Indeed, as additional security measures were devised to 
protect card distributions, losses in mailing were reduced to an in-
significant level.85 Yet, Congress made no attempt to determine the 
extent to which susceptibility to theft experienced in Chicago and 
elsewhere had been corrected by the issuers themselves. 
Reliance on the criminal-misuse rationale is also misplaced be-
cause Congress failed to realize that misuse would not be curbed by 
a legislative control that affected only unsolicited cards. The primary 
attraction of the credit card as a vehicle for criminal activity is the 
relative ease with which fraudulent charges can be made. Hence, a 
limitation on the conditions by which cards are distributed is likely 
to produce only an alteration in the techniques used to acquire 
cards.86 Most criminal use of such cards involves techniques that can 
be applied whether a credit card was unsolicited or issued pursuant 
to a request. Misappropriation techniques include diversion by dis-
honest employees of credit card issuers, thefts during burglaries or 
personal assaults, retention by dishonest merchants during sales 
transactions, and misdirection of cards by false applications or re-
quests for renewals87-none of which depends upon an initial un-
solicited issuance. A ban of unsolicited cards reduces the opportunity 
for criminal misuse insofar as it may limit the aggregate number 
of credit cards in circulation, but there is no indication that Con-
gress employed the ban of unsolicited mailings in order to limit the 
growth of the credit card industry. Until the underlying condition 
of ready acceptability is remedied, credit card crimes are not likely 
to be deterred. 
4. Privacy Intrusions 
Although the prohibition of unsolicited mailings is likely to have 
little impact in confronting the problems of inflation, credit misuse, 
or credit card crimes, the ban does have the effect of preventing 
further invasions of the privacy of card recipients. Yet, the prohi-
bition is a limited, rather than comprehensive, control of privacy 
85. According to one informal survey, three New York banks that mailed 2 mil-
lion cards in one week lost only 250 cards. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 
232, 235 (statement of New York State Senator John Dunne). 
86. Other measures such as more stringent identification procedures would make the 
card less readily usable by unauthorized holders, and hence would offer a more likely 
solution to the problem. See note 141 infra. 
87. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 242-43 (statement by William Lottes, 
Chief Postal Inspector, Post Office Department); Wall. St. J., Nov. 18, 1970, at I, col. 6. 
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intrusions. Despite the ban of the mailing of unsolicited cards, 
individuals continue to be subjected to mailings and solicitations 
in other forms. Circulars and application forms may still be mailed 
without limitation. 88 An issuer also may resort to telephone solici-
tations to induce the "request" required by the statute,89 and in 
many situations the telephone request may cause the recipient par-
ticular inconvenience. Such a solicitation commands the immediate 
attention of the person called and, unlike a mailing, may divert his 
concentration from more highly valued activities. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, because the legislative action forecloses one effective ave-
nue of solicitation, issuers will increasingly resort to these other 
forms. Hence, privacy intrusions from credit card issuers not only 
will continue, but also are likely to be attempted with increased 
frequency. 
In this perspective, the condition confronted by the new legisla-
tion does not address all the potential forms of privacy invasions by 
issuers, but only the specific intrusion unique to mailings of un-
solicited cards: such cards force recipients into commercial associa-
tions that they might not otherwise choose. Admittedly, as a result 
of general commercial practices, individuals are frequently thrust 
into a variety of involuntary associations, such as those that result 
from the distribution of subscription cards prestamped with the 
recipient's name or the use of one's name in promotional material 
sent to third parties.00 But the relationship that flows from unsolic-
ited credit cards has tw-o distinctive features: the recipient must take 
significant affirmative action to terminate the association, and the 
consequences of not terminating it are perceived to be great. 
The hearings held on the statute reveal that the mailing of un-
solicited cards was a matter of significant public concern. The reports 
are replete with letters from individuals expressing alarm because 
they had been extended credit.91 This response, from a public con-
88. While the legislation is intended to make it more difficult for issuers to get cards 
into the hands of recipients, the difficulty involved in securing a cardholder's commit• 
ment may be minimal. An issuer might offer to send a card if the preselected recipient 
indicates his assent on a business reply card. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 87, 
at 27 (statement of Senator Proxmire). 
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 84 supra. Techniques of oral solicitation 
have already been refined. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 179•91 (statement 
of Irvin Penner, President, The Gracious Lady Service, Inc., urging an exemption for 
oral solicitations). 
90. See A. MILLER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVACY 80-82 (1971). 
91. See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 57 (letter to Betty Furness, Spe• 
cial Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs); id. at 95•107 (letters to Represen-
tative Patman); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 88-39 (letters to Representative 
Bingham). 
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tinually subjected to a barrage of unwanted mail, may appear sur-
prising. The ferocity of the responses suggests, however, that the card 
mailings affected a particularly sensitive concern: most individuals 
regard their :financial affairs as highly personal matters and are 
offended when an account is created for them without their consent 
-perhaps with an institution with which they have had no previous 
contact. 
If that association could be terminated easily, the offensiveness 
of the intrusion would be minimal. Recipients thought, however, 
that the particular relationship created by a credit card could be 
ended only by considerable initiative on their part, and the perceived 
significance of a failure to do so was quite important. There was 
particular concern that the intended recipient might be liable for 
purchases made by someone who had intercepted the card from the 
mails. Despite considerable evidence that few issuers attempted to 
hold recipients liable for unauthorized uses occurring before an un-
solicited card came within their control, 92 many persons nevertheless 
believed that some liability might result.93 Even if the card arrived 
safely, discarding it would not necessarily produce the desired result; 
the card might be retrieved by another person and used to make 
charges against the holder's account.94 Some recipients regarded de-
struction of the card as a difficult task.95 Whether the card was inter-
cepted from the mails or arrived safely, there remained the risk that 
accounting errors would result in charges against the account.96 In 
any case, the cardholder would have to endure the inconvenience 
both of informing the issuer of the improper charges and presenting 
a credible case that the debts should not be attributed to him. 
While statistics suggest that only a small portion of intended re-
cipients took affirmative action to contact the card issuers,97 they do 
92. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 103, 106 (statement of Thomas Bailey, 
American Bankers Association); id. at 14, 18-19 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board 
of Governors, Federal Reserve System); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 91, 92 
(statement by Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, Inc.). See also FED. REsERVE 
Svs. REP., supra note 3, at 75. 
93. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 8, 11 (statement of Representa-
tive Hanley); id. at 63, 64 (statement of Robert Meade, Director, Legislative Affairs, 
President's Committee on Consumer Interests). 
94. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 96-97 (letter to Representative Patman 
evincing concern over disposing of a credit card). 
95. 116 CONG. REc. 11829 (1970) (statement of Senator Proxmire). 
96. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 32, 35 (statement of Paul Rand 
Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission). 
97. Several banks reported that less than one per cent of the mass-mailed cards 
were returned. 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 24 (statement of Thomas Bailey, 
American Bankers Association). Statistics compiled by Shell Oil Company show a return 
rate of I.I per cent. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 228. 
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not refute the presence of considerable concern and confusion in 
recipients' minds. Only a few individuals expended the additional 
effort to contact their legislative representatives, but the number 
was sufficiently large to prompt members of Congress to generalize 
the concern.98 Moreover, there was relatively little political risk in a 
stand against credit cards since the issue was not likely to generate 
general public opposition. Most people would not be angered if the 
flow of unsolicited cards were interrupted, and those who desired 
the opportunity to receive a credit card could do so by a simple 
request to issuers who were anxious to expand their programs. 
Presented with an opportunity to register support for the growing 
consumer protection movement without inviting public controversy, 
the legislators were secure in approving the measure. 
5. The Relative Importance of the Stated Legislative Objectives 
Analysis of the legislative deliberations suggests that the associa-
tion between the first three conditions-inflationary pressures, un-
reasonable consumer debt, increased crime-and unsolicited credit 
cards was not established to a degree justifying congressional action. 
The fourth condition-privacy intrusions-is not a feature unique to 
unsolicited credit cards, but can be understood only in terms of the 
forced associations resulting from unsolicited mailings and the sensi-
tivity of consumers to interference with their personal financial 
affairs. 
The singular prominence of the concern for the impact of forced 
associations is highlighted by the realization that the other legisla-
tive objectives could have been furthered by measures less drastic 
than the mailing prohibition. Indeed, the desired effects would have 
been fostered by a statute that simply imposed the costs of card mis-
use solely on the issuer. This is particularly true with respect to the 
concern for increased crime and personal bankruptcies. Forcing is-
suers to bear the cost of criminal misuse-as other provisions of the 
statute require99-assures that precautions will be taken to curtail 
losses attributable to these causes.100 Similarly, discharge of consumer 
debts through the bankruptcy process will lead issuers to tighten 
their lending practices and raise their credit standards. In either case, 
the additional measure of prohibiting unsolicited mailings would 
98. See, e.g., 1967 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 95-107 (letters to Representative 
Patman). 
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
100. See Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418, 1424-26 
(1968). 
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seem inefficient since it affects only a limited number of credit card 
arrangements.101 But, while the mailing prohibition is an ineffective 
tool for securing these other goals, it is highly effective in protecting 
recipients from the intrusion of an undesired financial involvement. 
Therefore, the form of control enacted seems most responsive to 
the privacy objective, for, unlike the other forms of regulation con-
sidered by Congress, it produces an abrupt termination of the condi-
tion that produced dissatisfaction. Enactment of the mailing pro-
hibition is justified only if protection of association is recognized 
as its primary objective. 
B. The Operational Impact of the Mailing Prohibition 
I. The Impact on Competition 
The prohibition of the mailing of unsolicited cards is likely to 
provide individuals with the desired protection from involuntary 
financial associations, but a question remains whether the prohibi-
tion produces negative consequences that outweigh the policies justi-
fying enactment. A potential consequence of particular importance 
is the extent to which the ban either deters new entrants in the 
credit card field or limits the growth of existing small issuers. While 
congressional concern with the possible anticompetitive consequence 
of the statute was given expression in early versions of S. 721,102 the 
final enactment contains no provision responsive to it. This omission 
suggests the difficulty of securing effective distribution controls while 
at the same time allowing issuers the relatively free access to markets 
necessary to support competitive card plans. 
An issuer undertaking a card program on a large scale faces sig-
nificant start-up costs, particularly if its card program is not part of a 
merchandising operation.103 These costs may result in an operating 
101. Control of inflation is not as readily achieved by alternative measures. Its 
"costs" cannot be assessed directly to issuers. Legislative measures, however, could im-
pose an obligation on the issuer to deter inflationary expansion of card credit that 
would be more likely to achieve the desired result than the restriction adopted. The 
issuer might, for example, be assigued an aggregate credit limit to be observed in its 
card program. This could be based on the extent of substituted credit used in the plan 
or an amount deemed within the limits of reasonable consumer credit growth. 
102. The original version of S. 721 provided that the mailing prohibition would take 
effect six months after the bill's enactment. S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969). In 
addition, the Committee versions required that unsolicited cards that were previously 
sent could be renewed only upon request. S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1969). 
Both of these provisions were intended to limit the competitive advantage given to 
banks with established plans. See 116 CONG. REc. 11832-34 (1970) (debate on Senator 
Williams' amendment to relax the renewal requirements). 
103. A merchandiser is already carrying on sales transactions into which his card 
may be introduced. 
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loss during early years.104 In addition, considerable expense is 
necessary to maintain an efficient accounting system. Profitability 
of a card plan is by no means assured, as is evidenced by the abandon-
ment of a number of the earliest bank card plans.105 
Because of the sizable investment and operating costs required, 
profitability depends upon the participation of a large number of 
subscribers with active accounts.106 In order to generate the necessary 
volume, most nonmerchandising issuers resorted to the mass distri-
bution of unsolicited cards.107 Issuers realized that many persons who 
would be requested to join a plan would not be prepared to do so at 
the time the request was made. Unsolicited cards were distributed 
because a solicitation that merely invited the recipient to submit an 
application was likely to be discarded and forgotten before the de-
sire to use a credit card arose. If, on the other hand, the card itself 
were placed in his hands, a recipient might retain the card and use 
it when a need for credit occurred. Moreover, receipt of the card 
made it unnecessary for a person to take the affirmative step of pre-
paring and submitting a formal application form. The incomplete 
statistics that are available suggest that issuers are correct in believ-
ing that the mailing of unsolicited cards attracts more users than 
distribution of application forms and promotional material.1°8 It 
104. The Bank of America card plan, for example, did not operate at a profitable 
level during its first four years, despite the fact that it developed in a market with 
fewer competitors than presently exists in most cities. Wall St. J., May 24, 1966, at 32, 
cols. 2-3. A recent survey revealed that start-up costs averaged two per cent of total 
bank operating expenses, followed by current e.xpenses matching current revenues after 
one and one-half to two and one-half years, and a complete recovery of start-up costs 
within three to four years. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 27-28. Programs 
begun during more recent periods have had similar experiences. 1969 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 39, at ll8, 121 (statement of James Brown, Interbank Card Association). 
105. See FED. RE.sERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, at 30. Some have questioned whether 
the banking industry's original optimism about the profitability of bank card plans was 
justified. Because of relatively high credit and fraud losses, as well as unanticipated 
operating costs, one industry representative has observed that "many banks with credit 
card plans are beginning to adopt the view that the cards do not represent a good profit 
opportunity." American Banker, April 7, 1971, at 24, col. 1 (statement of John R. 
Bunting, President, First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co.). 
106. See Davenport, supra note I, at 225 n.32; FED. RE.sERVE SYs. REP., supra note 3, 
at 25-27. It is difficult to interest merchants in the plan without a large backlog of sub-
scribers. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 14, 24 (statement of Andrew F. 
Brimmer, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). 
107. See FED. REsERvE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 26. Notable exceptions arc the 
early independent card plans-Diners' Club, American E.xprcss, and Carte Blancl1e. 
These programs not only depend upon applications for participants, but also charge an 
annual fee, a practice not followed in bank card plans. The card plans of many mer-
chandising issuers, such as oil companies, initially relied upon solicitations of appli· 
cations, but later switched to unsolicited mailings to selected groups. 
108. A study undertaken by Shell Oil Company found that 38.3 per cent of those 
persons who received unsolicited credit cards eventually used them, while only 14.4 
per cent of those from whom applications were solicited ultimately activated card ac-
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thus appears that a competitive card program can be more rapidly 
and cheaply established when cardholders are attracted by distribu-
tion of unsolicited cards. 
Myriad factors will influence the long-run impact that the ban 
of unsolicited mailings will have on competition. In many areas, 
plans had been established prior to the prohibition, and the profit 
potential for new entrants was already limited. The publicity sur-
rounding the growth of credit card usage has increased the public's 
familiarity with credit cards and lessened the resistance of potential 
cardholders formerly encountered.100 In those areas in which new 
card plans could operate profitably, other types of promotional efforts 
to secure applicants may now be more productive. The success of the 
unsolicited-mailing technique may have led issuers to underestimate 
alternative marketing approaches. It is clear, however, that the stat-
ute has disrupted the operation of the credit card market: small and 
potential issuers will be forced to resort to distribution techniques 
that may be more costly than unsolicited mailings.11° Even if experi-
mentation establishes the success of alternative approaches, there is 
likely to be at least a short-run limitation on the number of new 
entrants and growth of small issuers, thereby limiting the competi-
tion that existing programs will encounter. 
2. The Scope of the Prohibition 
The prohibition of the mailing of unsolicited cards is stated in 
absolute terms: "No credit card shall be issued except in response 
to a request or application therefor."111 Exceptions are made in two 
situations for issuances that have been preceded by the holder's 
acceptance of a card: the prohibition "does not apply to the issuance 
of a credit card in renewal of, or in substitution for, an accepted 
counts. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 161. An earlier survey by an issuer 
bank indicated a similar disparity. Nineteen per cent of unsolicited card recipients 
activated accounts shortly after receipt, while only 0.66 per cent of those who were sent 
application forms eventually applied for a card. See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra 
note 3, at 76. This survey does not indicate the extent of card use among applicants. 
The extent of the disparity in the surveys has been explained as an incident of the 
early timing of the surveys and the nature of the promotional effort. See 1969 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 39, at 110 (statements of Senator Proxmire and Thomas :Bailey, 
American :Bankers Association). 
109. Cf. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 110 (statement of Thomas :Bailey, 
American :Bankers Association). 
110. Some segments of the banking industry have expressed this concern. See 116 
CONG. REc. 11834 (1970) (letter to Senator Hatfield from The Commercial :Bank, Salem, 
Oregon). 
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
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credit card."112 The former practice of mailing cards to persons 
whose names were obtained from existing bank accounts, credit card 
bureaus, or similar sources is ·no longer permissible. Questions do 
remain, however, with respect to the breadth of the statutory pro-
hibition. 
A marketing technique occasionally used in the past was the 
negative premailer, a printed promotion stating that a card would 
be sent to the recipient unless he took affirmative action to inform 
the issuer that the card was not desired. The question whether a 
recipient's silence could be interpreted as a "request" under the 
statutory standard is answered by the legislative history. Proposals to 
permit such a technique were made at several stages in the evolution 
of the statutory language.113 However, in presenting S. 721 on the 
floor of the Senate, Senator Proxmire specifically noted that it was 
intended to preclude use of the negative premailer.114 Thus, the 
application of the prohibition to this practice seems clear. 
Solicitations that are permitted include all forms of mail contact 
requesting the recipient's participation in a plan. As long as affirma-
tive action by the recipient is required to trigger the issuance of a 
card, the contact will not violate the statutory prohibition.116 An 
affirmative response made verbally, as in the course of a personal or 
telephone solicitation, satisfies the statutory standard.110 
Considerable attention was given to determining whether to 
apply the mailing prohibition to a card issued in renewal of a pre-
viously issued unsolicited card. In a provision designed to limit the 
competitive advantage derived by existing firms that had previously 
issued unsolicited cards, the Senate Committee's version of S. 721 
would have required the initial renewal of such cards to be made 
pursuant to a request.117 This requirement was removed by an 
amendment on the Senate floor.118 While this history indicates the 
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
113. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 114 (statement by Thomas 
Bailey, American Bankers Association). Letters to Senator Hatfield indicate that he had 
considered the inclusion of a provision permitting negative premailers. See note 110 
supra. 
, 114. 116 CoNG. REc. 11829 (1970). 
115. Id. 
116. One of the bills introduced in the House specifically provided that cards could 
be sent only in response to a written request. See H.R. 15103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), 
cited in 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 108, 119-20. This measure was not 
seriously considered, and little attention was given to the requirement of a writing. 
117. See 116 CONG. REc. 11827 (1970). See also S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Scss. 
8 (1970). 
118. 116 CONG. REC. 11832-34 (1970). 
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primary import of the renewal exception, the application of the 
provision in one situation may generate confusion. A renewal card 
may be issued only for an accepted card.119 This term is defined, in 
part, to mean "any card which the cardholder has requested and 
received or has signed or has used or authorized another to use."120 
An unsolicited card would, by definition, not meet the terms in the 
first conjunctive since it would not have been "requested and re-
ceived." Mere receipt amounts to acceptance only if a card has been 
requested; therefore, an unsolicited card would be "accepted" only 
upon being signed, used, or given to another person for use. While 
an issuer could identify those persons who had used an unsolicited 
card, the signing of a card or authorization of another's use would 
not necessarily come to the issuer's attention. An appropriate regard 
for caution should lead issuers to withhold renewals from all holders 
of unsolicited cards except those whose cards had actually been 
used.121 
3. Enforcement of the Prohibition 
The version of the credit card statute that was finally adopted 
by the Senate includes no express sanction for disobedience of the 
prohibition of unsolicited mailings.122 While the legislative history 
of the provision does not indicate the manner in which violations 
are to be treated, a variety of enforcement tools are available. The 
credit card statute amended a chapter of the 1968 Truth-in-Lending 
Act123 designed primarily to compel disclosure of interest and finance 
charges in consumer credit transactions. The Truth-in-Lending Act, 
therefore, contains the sanctions that were presumably intended to 
apply to the limitation on distribution of unsolicited cards. But 
while there are provisions in the Act for criminal, civil, and admin-
istrative enforcement, these do not all apply with equal force to the 
credit card provisions. The criminal provisions, including punish-
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(1) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
121. As might be expected, some banks adhere to a practice of not renewing cards 
that are not used for extended periods of time. See 116 CONG. REc. 11834 (1970) (letter 
to Senator Hatfield from The Commercial Banic, Salem, Oregon). 
122. While most issuers have complied with the ban, there is still some basis for 
concern. At least one oil company completed an unsolicited mailing after the effective 
date of the Act. Interview with Randolph May, law student, Durham, N.C., May 13, 
1970. This violation was apparently the result of insufficient information about the 
existence of the ban. The statutory prohibition has necessitated administrative inter-
pretations in other situations. See, e.g., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ,r,r 30,664, 
30,807 (1972) (excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. opinion letters). 
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-Slt (1970). 
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ment by fine and imprisonment, may be invoked for any willful and 
knowing failure to comply with any requirement imposed under that 
subchapter, which now encompasses the credit card provisions.124 
The administrative enforcement procedures similarly apply to all 
requirements imposed under the relevant subchapter.126 Violations 
in industries within the jurisdiction of specified regulatory agencies 
are enforceable by those agencies. Enforcement efforts against bank 
credit card plans, for example, are to be undertaken by the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, and the Director of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation.126 In industries not specifically enumerated, the Federal 
Trade Commission is granted enforcement power.127 While some of 
these agencies have become actively involved in enforcement of the 
interest disclosure provisions of the Act, there has been only limited 
administrative action under the mailing ban. This inactivity may 
reflect general compliance with the proscription by the credit card 
industry. 
The Truth-in-Lending Act provides civil remedies for violation 
of its provisions,128 but, because of the terminology of the section, 
private recovery cannot extend to violations of the credit card dis-
tribution ban. The civil action is available only when there is a 
failure to disclose any required information, and therefore cannot be 
used to remedy violations of the mailing prohibition, which involves 
no disclosure requirement. The absence of discussion of the enforce-
ment question during the hearings and floor debate makes it uncer-
tain that Congress actually meant to preclude the availability of a 
private remedy. It cannot yet be determined whether the existence of 
criminal sanctions and administrative relief provides adequate en-
forcement alternatives and compensates for the lack of civil remedies. 
Although administrative enforcement of the Truth-in-Lending 
Act is allocated to a diverse group of agencies, authority for the 
promulgation of interpretive rulings is centralized. While the credit 
card amendments do not specifically authorize administrative inter-
pretations, a general provision of the Truth-in-Lending Act grants 
authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
to promulgate regulations.129 This authority includes the power not 
124. 15 u.s.c. § 1611(3) (1970). 
125. 15 u.s.c. § 1607 (1970). 
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(l) (1970). 
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1970). 
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970). 
Jg9. 15 v.s.c. ~ 1604 (1970), 
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only to interpret the Act, but also to make adjustments and excep-
tions in its operation. The legislative history of the credit card 
amendments indicates a desire by the Board of Governors to limit 
its rule-making responsibility in this area.130 Nonetheless, the Board 
continues to have interpretive authority under the amended Act, 
which now extends to the adopted provisions relating to credit cards. 
Indeed, the Board has issued amendments to its Regulation Z in-
tended to assist the implementation of the statutory credit card 
controls.131 
The Board's initial regulations are primarily directed toward 
the limitation on cardholder liability and present no significant 
elaboration on the operation of the prohibition of unsolicited mail-
ings. The regulations do, however, detail the manner in which state 
statutory controls will be approved as an alternative means of reg-
ulating mailings. Pursuant to a provision of the Truth-in-Lending 
Act, 132 state regulatory schemes will be operative if the Board finds 
that they impose requirements "substantially similar" to those estab-
lished by the Act.133 Upon Board approval, transactions subject to 
state control are exempt from the operation of the Act. It is doubtful 
that there will be any general effort by states to exercise their option 
for local control. Prior to the adoption of the federal credit card 
legislation, only a few states indicated an interest in controlling 
unsolicited mailings. The statutes enacted attempted to limit card-
holder liability for misuse of unsolicited cards and, thus, were more 
limited in scope than the subsequent federal controls.134 Since any 
130. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text. Since the enacted legislation re-
lieved the Board of the responsibility for credit card regulations, that response might 
be interpreted as indicating the Committee's intention to remove the Board from all 
responsibility for control of credit cards, including that which would arise under the 
more general delegation of authority under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The legislative 
history, however, does not clearly indicate such an intention. The shift from a regula-
tory scheme to a statutory ban appears to have been as much a result of a desire to 
make the statute more rigorous as a concession to the reluctance of the Board of Gov-
ernors. Pressures to strengthen the bill came from several sources, including the Chair-
man of the Federal Trade Commission. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 
38-39 (statement by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission). The 
Committee acknowledged the influence of these suggestions in explaining its decision 
to abandon the regulatory structure. See S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1970). 
In addition, while the Committee minority assumed that the Board's role had been 
removed, the floor sponsor of the measure acknowledged the availability of its residual 
rule-making authority. See ll6 CoNG. R.Ec. II84-2 (1970) (statement by Senator Prox-
mire). 
131. See 36 Fed. Reg. 1040, 1041 (1971). 
132. 15 u.s.c. § 1633 (1970). 
133. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(a)(l) (1971), as amended, 36 Fed. Reg. 1040-41 (1971). 
134. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE ANN. § 1718 (West. Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
121½, § 381 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255, § 12E (Supp. 1971). 
See generally Kennedy, supra note 33, at 44-47. Enactment of the state credit card laws 
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new state control would likely be substantially duplicative, most 
policies that would be promoted by state control are satisfied by 
the federal enactment. The fact that Congress has assumed the 
initiative in legislating in this area has reduced both the need and 
incentive for state regulation. State control will probably be exer-
cised only with respect to those businesses traditionally subject to 
extensive state controls. Since few existing card issuers are of this 
type, the majority of credit card transactions will no doubt remain 
subject to direct federal regulation. 
III. CARDHOLDER LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED USE 
Unlike the House measures, S. 721 also addressed the problem 
of cardholder liability for unauthorized use. As ultimately enacted, 
the statute provides that a cardholder bears no liability for the 
misuse of his card by another person unless the issuer has previously 
informed the cardholder of the liability provision, provided a pre-
stamped, self-addressed notification-of-loss form, and issued a credit 
card that contains a means of identifying the authorized user. 
Even if the issuer satisfies these conditions, the cardholder's max-
imum liability is fifty dollars and, in any event, the cardholder is 
not liable for losses sustained after he has notified the issuer.185 
Prior to the statute, most issuers imposed upon cardholders the 
legal responsibility for all unauthorized charges made until the card-
holder had notified the issuer of the loss.130 While issuers often did 
not in fact seek to hold cardholders responsible to the extent per-
mitted under the cardholder agreements,187 this legal framework 
created the popular assumption that the loss allocation system placed 
ultimate responsibility on individual cardholders. The statute funda-
mentally reverses this relationship by placing primary legal respon-
sibility for fraud losses on issuers. 
Some question remains, however, as to whether the mechanism 
chosen for implementation of the new liability system is desirable 
in light of its probable effectiveness. Achievement of the statutory 
objectives depends largely upon cardholder awareness of the new 
did not silence the complaints by consumers concerning credit card abuses, particularly 
in the area of invasion of privacy. See 116 CONG, REc. S0876 (1970), 
IS5. 15 U.S.C. § 164S(a) (1970), set out in note S4 supra. See also Note, Consumer 
Protection-Credit Card Protection Under the Truth in Lending Act, 49 N.C. L. REv. 
775 (1971). 
IS6. See Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty To Read-Business Run by 
IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1070, 
1080 (1966); Bergsten, supra note 2, at 488-97. 
lll7. See note 198 infra. 
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rules that govern use of credit cards. But, dissemination of informa-
tion about the statute is dependent upon action by the issuer.138 
Unfortunately, the statute fails to provide an adequate incentive for 
the desired issuer response and, hence, undermines the effectiveness 
of the limited liability provisions. 
A. The Rationale of the Statutory Liability System 
The federal credit card statute reflects a policy decision that it is 
preferable for the issuer to bear fraud losses arising from credit card 
use. While the legislative history of the Act includes little com-
mentary that documents the basis upon which this choice was made, 
various considerations suggest its desirability. 
A system of issuer liability is preferable because it stimulates 
more efficient precautions against losses.139 If issuers are made to bear 
fraud losses, they will implement procedures controlling such costs 
in order to preserve the profitability of their operations. The amount 
they spend for loss control is a function of the amount of loss ex-
perienced: in an optimal situation, issuers will expend money for 
loss control as long as each additional expenditure results in the pre-
vention of losses of a greater amount. If cardholders were to bear 
these losses individually, they, too, would respond with preventive 
measures. But their responses would not be economically efficient; 
their loss minimization measures would likely include unnecessary 
and ineffective devices.140 On the other hand, issuers have superior 
access to information about the cost, frequency, and causes of fraud 
losses. In addition, issuers are in a better position to control the 
occun-ence of these losses. They not only select the merchants who 
may accept the card and the holders who may use it, but also design 
ll!S. See note 202 infra and accompanying text. 
139. The argument is fully explored in Note, supra note 100, at 1423-28. 
140. The decision to relieve individual cardholders of most responsibility for un-
authorized charges, while readily supportable, represents a significant departure from 
older notions of loss allocation. Common law liability concepts suggest that the card• 
holder bears such losses because of his likely contribution to their occurrence. The 
cardholder has control of the card and can seemingly guard against its misuse by 
limiting the exposure to loss. Thus, because the cardholder is more likely than the 
issuer to be "at fault" when unauthorized use occurs, he should accept responsibility 
for his dereliction, even though it may not satisfy negligence principles. 
To the extent that the statute continues a limited liability, see text accompanying 
note 145 infra, it recognizes some need to stimulate protective cardholder behavior. 
But its liability provisions represent a general rejection of traditional analysis. They 
implicitly recognize that an inquiry into "fault" places too great an emphasis upon 
the proximity of a party to the loss event. A more appropriate inquiry is the parties' 
relative loss-control capacity. Viewed in this light, the question of loss allocation can 
properly take account of the issuer's predominant role in shaping the system that 
produces fraud losses. 
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the security systems for card distribution, user identification,141 and 
loss notification. Hence, the statutory choice of issuer liability assures 
that the problem of credit card loss is the responsibility of the party 
most likely to take efficient steps in its resolution.142 
A system of issuer liability also ensures that fraud losses are spread 
over a large number of transactions so that the impact on any one 
cardholder is slight; the issuer initially accepts the loss and then 
spreads it back to cardholders or merchants in the form of increased 
service costs. Such a system is desirable because placing primary 
liability on the holder of a card that is fraudulently used may impose 
large, and potentially ruinous, costs on individuals.143 It is true that 
under a system of cardholder liability, cardholders could agree among 
themselves to spread fraud losses; this result is achieved when indi-
vidual holders are joined together in an insurance plan. However, 
insurance plans existing prior to the federal enactment indicate the 
undesirability of this technique, for the insurance cost per card was 
141. Photographs, code devices, and voice prints are possible identification tech• 
niques. See Bergsten, supra note 2, at 506 (photographs); Coha, Credit Card Fraud, 
BANKERS MONTHLY, June 15, 1967, at 24, 26-27 (code devices); Livingston, Banliing's 
Role in a Credit Card Economy, BANKING, Sept. 1966, at 111, 112 (voice prints). 
142. The loss allocation approach of the statute has been rejected by at least one 
commentator. After an extensive review and criticism of liability-until-notice schemes, 
the student author states: "As a basic premise, the most equitable methods [sic] of 
distributing fraud loss is to spread it as evenly as possible among those parties who 
derive benefits from the credit card system. Since both card issuers and cardholders 
enjoy reciprocal benefits from the use of credit cards, it would seem reasonable for 
them to equally absorb losses generated by their misuse." It is then proposed that all 
cardholders of a particular issuer be assessed a proportionate part of fifty per cent of 
the fraud losses experienced by the issuer. The remainder would be borne by the issuer 
itself. See Comment, The Apportionment of Credit Fraud Losses, 4 U. CAL, (DAVIS) 
L. REv. 377, 399 (1971). 
In light of the limited attention that has been given to loss allocation questions, 
this suggestion must be credited for its originality in attempting to resolve a difficult 
question. The proposed solution must be rejected, however. The relative benefit derived 
by cardholder and issuer from a credit card system would seem to be an inappropriate 
foundation for loss allocation; for the evaluation, and indeed definition, of "benefit" 
is largely normative and is not subject to resolution that withstands objective scrutiny, 
Relatedly, this approach presumes that the providers and consumers of credit card 
systems derive a similar utility that permits meaningful comparison, an assumption 
that is doubtful. Finally, at the basis of the proposed system is the expectation that 
the cardholders' costs will be limited to those assessed directly. The cardholders' costs 
cannot, however, be so easily controlled. The issuer remains free to spread all or a 
portion of the remainder of its losses to cardholders in the form of indirect costs, such 
as larger merchant discounts, less convenient service, and so on. Under acceptable no• 
tions of governmental regulation, it is simply not possible to dictate the extent of 
cost-spreading in which the issuer will engage. It is, of course, feasible to rely upon 
competitive pressures to limit the attractiveness of cost-spreading; this is the approach 
taken by the federal credit card statute. But the result achieved under the statute is 
much less perfect than that required for the system proposed in the above Comment, 
143. 1969 Senate Hearings, mpra note 39, at 63-75 (statement of Robert Meade, Di• 
rector, Legislative Affairs, President's Committee on Consumer Interests); Note, supra 
note 100, at 1426 &: nn.50 &: 52. 
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significantly higher than that incurred under a more perfect loss-
spreading system.144 Therefore, in order to minimize the impact 
of each loss occurrence in the most efficient manner, the issuer's 
superior knowledge and cost-spreading position are a more appropri-
ate basis for a loss distribution scheme. 
The new credit card law does not create an absolute issuer-
liability system, for the cardholder may be held liable for up to fifty 
dollars resulting from unauthorized uses. This limited cardholder 
liability is commonly justified on twu bases. First, the prospect of 
potential liability is intended to operate as an incentive to the card-
holder to give the issuer prompt notice of loss.145 The incentive is 
provided by the fact that the cardholder may limit his liability to 
less than the statutory maximum; he bears liability only for unau-
thorized charges made prior to notification. Second, the provision for 
partial cardholder liability serves to encourage a cardholder to exer-
cise proper care in the use and protection of his card; ·without such 
care the amount of fraud loss incurred by the issuer would increase. 
The congressional objective was to implement a regulatory scheme 
that limits cardholder liability without at the same time increasing 
the economic and social costs resulting from unauthorized use of 
credit cards. The optimal balance in the statutory structure can be 
obtained if the cardholder incurs only the degree of liability neces-
sary to ensure proper control of his card and prompt notice of loss 
to the issuer. 
144. Note, supra note 100, at 1427-28. 
The author estimated that the average loss per card is $0.25 per year. Assuming 
that the average family has six credit cards, insurance costs range from $0.45 per card 
for minimum protection to $1.33 per card for coverage adequate in most cases. 
The estimate of $0.25 fraud loss per card may be too large. It was based on an 
assumption of then current nationwide fraud losses of 50 million dollars, TIME, Nov. 
24, 1967, at 80. The absence of a systematic method for calculating such losses is re-
flected in the disparity of other contemporary estimates. The range has been placed 
at 20 to 30 million dollars, Bergsten, supra note 2, at 487; 40 million dollars, Maiden-
berg, Personal Finance: Holders of Credit Cards Are Warned That Losing Them 
Can Prove Costly, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1967, at 69, col. 3; 20 to 50 million dollars, 
Coha, supra note 141, at 24. More recent estimates have tun as high as 150 million 
dollars, 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of Representative Nix). 
The fraud losses of the Midwest Bank Card System, after start-up difficulties had 
been overcome, has been stated to be 0.12" per cent. Id. at 91, 97 (testimony of Earl 
Pollock, Midwest Bank Card System, Inc., characterizing its recent performance as "en-
viable"). If this figure were projected over the entire industry for 1967, see note 45 
supra, nationwide fraud losses for that year would have been approximately 14 million 
dollars. In fact, 1967 fraud losses may have been considerably higher due to the initial 
experience of the Chicago banks, see notes 9-30 supra. and accompanying text. The 
statistics available for most issuers do not distinguish benvecn fraud and credit losses. 
See FED. REsERVE SYS. REP., supra note 3, at 32; 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, 
at 230 (re1;>ort of losses by Shell Oil Co.) 
145. Note, supra note 100, at 1426. See also 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 
71, 73 (statement of Professor Willier, National Consumer Law Center, Boston College); 
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In seeking this balance, difficulties are encountered in determin-
ing the level of exposure to loss necessary to produce the desired 
cardholder response. The statute provides that a cardholder may bear 
up to fifty dollars liability for each -card that he owns. If a number of 
cards are lost at one time, the aggregate loss faced by the cardholder 
may be significant. The liability necessary to induce notice and care 
is probably not related to the number of cards lost. A potential 
liability sufficient to stimulate cardholder action when one card is 
lost should suffice to prompt the same response when three or four 
cards have been lost. While this suggests that it may have been pref-
erable to establish a potential liability for each incidence of loss 
rather than for each card involved, such a scheme would create sig-
nificant administrative difficulties. In the event of loss of several 
cards, a number of different issuers would have potential claims 
against the cardholder. If the latter's liability were limited to fifty 
dollars, it would be necessary either to divide the amount of liability 
between several independent claimants or to select an issuer whose 
claim was to be preferred. The operating costs of such a system might 
be excessive and, to the extent that distribution of cardholder loss 
results in a complicated administrative structure, the potential for 
confusion among cardholders as to their responsibility for loss is 
increased. 
B. The Operation of the Statutory Liability Limitation 
Once the decision has been made to limit a cardholder's liability 
for unauthorized use, a mechanism to effectuate that choice is neces-
sary. The provisions of the federal credit card statute attempt to 
define the scope and operation of the new cardholder protection. 
Legislative directives have been provided for many of the policy 
choices that have to be made. Thus, the drafters sought to define the 
information that issuers must convey to cardholders,140 the steps 
cardholders must take in giving the issuer notification of the loss 
of a card,147 and the types of credit devices subject to statutory 
1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 225, 226-27 (submission of W. J. Bittles, Jr., 
General Manager of Retail Marketing, Shell Oil Co., urging the adoption of a $100 
liability limit). 
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1602G) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. The Federal Reserve Board 
has indicated that acceptable notice may take the following form: 
You may be liable for the unauthorized use of your credit card (or other term 
which describes the credit device). You will not be liable for unauthorized use 
which occurs after you notify (name of card issuer or his designee) at (address) 
orally or in writing of loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use. In any case liability 
shall not exceed (insert-$50 or any lesser amount under other applicable law or 
under any agreement with the cardholder). 
36 Fed. Reg. 1041 ·(1971). 
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. The Federal Reserve Board 
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control.148 There are, however, a number of questions concerning 
the operation of the statute that have not been adequately resolved. 
In many areas, insufficient attention was given to the potential diffi-
culties that might arise in implementation. Several of these problem 
areas involve matters of fundamental importance in achieving a 
workable statutory scheme. The discussion that follows pursues some 
of the important questions raised by the statute. 
I. Transactional Exemption for Business Use 
The federal credit card enactment was added as an amendment 
to the previously adopted Truth-in-Lending Act. This graft of the 
credit card provision onto a statute designed to control other credit-
has interpreted the statute to mean that the preaddressed, prestamped, notification-
of-loss form provided by the issuer is not the exclusive means by which noti-
fication may be given, 36 Fed Reg. 1041 (1971). The Board's Regulations also provide 
that a notice made in writing "shall be considered given at the time of receipt or, 
whether or not received, at the expiration of the time ordinarily required for trans-
mission, whichever is earlier.'' Id. 
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. The applicability of the 
fifty-dollar liability limitation to traditional credit cards such as oil company and bank 
cards is clear, but its effect upon other types of instruments requires analysis of the 
statutory definition. An illustrative device is the card issued to telephone subscribers. 
Although popularly referred to as "credit cards," these have a different function than 
the traditional charge plate. The latter must usually be submitted to the merchant at 
the time of sale, but telephone services may be purchased on the mere oral presentation 
of information on the card. Requests for service are accepted without the issuer or 
seller verifying the existence of a card. That which entitles the user to credit is not 
the card itself, but rather the information on it. Since the card itself is not needed to 
transmit that information, such "card" does not appear to exist "for the purpose of 
obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit" as required by 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1602(k) (1970). 
The nature of the statutory scheme further suggests that it was not intended to 
apply to telephone "credit cards.'' While the drafters required that issuers include 
on the card a means of identification, the techniques contemplated were such things 
as siguature blocks and photographs. See 1968 Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 80, 
85, 92 (testimony of Professor Bergsten, University of Iowa, College of Law); 116 CONG, 
REc. 11841 (1970) (statement of Senator Percy). These techniques will not prevent loss 
when the card itself is not presented during the transaction. The intent seems to have 
been to cover only cards on which more reliable identification techniques would pro-
tect the authorized user against loss. Such an identification mechanism might be devised 
for telephone cards, but the legislative history does not indicate that Congress had one 
in mind. The implication is that only the traditional cards are included within the 
statutory coverage. 
Other identification devices raise similar questions. For example, many banks issue 
check guarantee cards that resemble credit cards in their size and content. They enable 
the holder to cash checks with merchants or banks with whom the holder has had no 
previous contact. Under some guarantee plans, the holder may use the card to cash a 
check even though an overdraft is created in the account. A card that gives this privi-
lege may be said to exist "for the purpose of obtaining money ••• on credit," even 
if a particular holder uses his guarantee card only when his checking account balance 
is sufficient to cover the checks he writes. In the more typical plan, however, the card 
is only identification, and the user is not permitted to overdraw his account. The check 
guarantee card that gives no credit privilege is not within the statutory definition, and 
its misuse is not subject to the statutory limitations. 
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related practices has produced significant interpretive problems. 
For example, the Truth-in-Lending Act exempts from its coverage 
"[c]redit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or 
commercial purposes ... or to organizations."149 The credit card 
statute does not offer specific directives concerning the manner in 
which the liability limitations are to be applied to cards that are used 
for both business and nonbusiness purposes; the common practice 
of using one card for these dual purposes increases the importance of 
the interpretation given to the transactional exemption.1u0 
A threshold question in the determination of the application of 
the transactional exemption to these hybrid cards involves identifica-
tion of the point at which an "extension of credit" is made. In the 
amended statute, the term "credit" is defined to include "the right 
... to incur debt and defer its payment."11i1 Therefore, credit exists 
under the statute not only when a current purchase is made, but 
also in situations where the right to defer payment extends to future 
or potential indebtedness. As applied to credit cards, this suggests 
that credit is extended at the time the card is issued, for that event 
creates the cardholder's right to apply the card to deferred payment 
purchases. By issuing the card, the credit card company has endowed 
the holder with authority to establish a debtor relationship with the 
issuer.152 
Under this interpretation of "extension of credit," the applica-
tion of the statutory exemption is clear in some cases. For example, 
the Federal Reserve Board expressed the view that the liability lim-
149. 15 u.s.c. § 1603(1) (1970). 
150. The Federal Reserve Board has indicated that it regards the business-purposes 
exemption of section 104 as applicable to transactions involving credit cards. See 4 CCH 
CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE ,r 30,682 (1971) (excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. letter of June 3, 
1971, No. 483, by Griffith L. Garwood, Chief, Truth-in-Lending Section): id. ,i 30,708 
(excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. letter of July 15, 1971, No. 505, by Griffith L. Ganvood). 
But a hearing examiner for the Federal Trade Commission has rejected a similar con• 
tention made by a firm attempting to justify its promotion of a credit card protection 
scheme. See Credit Card Serv. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 11 19,967, at 21,987, 
21,988 (April 13, 1972). 
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1970) (emphasis added). 
152. It would be possible to argue that credit is extended not at the time of issuance 
of a card, but rather at the time the card is actually used to purchase goods and services. 
This theory leads to unreasonable results when applied to doctrines of credit card mis• 
use. Assuming that an unauthorized user makes purchases for his business or commer• 
cial purpose, under this view the limited-liability provisions of the credit card statute 
would not be available to the cardholder because the card had been used for business 
or commercial purposes. Aside from the difficulties attendant to any theory relying on 
the subjective intent or purpose of an unauthorized user (a class of persons notorious 
for their unavailability at the time their testimony is needed), an interpretation of tl1e 
statute that would deny the statutory protection to a cardholder according to the pur• 
poses for which a thief used the credit card stretches the business purpose envisioned 
by Congress beyond tlle breaking point. 
Aµgust 1972] Federal Control of Credit Cards 1515 
itation is inapplicable to credit cards that can be used only in con-
nection with business activity.153 The limitation to business use may 
be established upon issuance of the card either from the nature of 
the card or from limitations established by the cardholder. Illustra-
tively, the card may be issued to business firms solely for use by 
employees in business related travel and entertainment. 
In many situations, however, it cannot be determined at the time 
of issuance whether a card represents an extension of credit for busi-
ness or commercial purposes. Many individuals secure general pur-
pose credit cards and use them to make both personal and business 
purchases. The statute does not provide guidance for determining 
its application to situations involving mixed uses. This may there-
fore be an appropriate occasion for the Federal Reserve Board to 
exercise its rule-making authority. The availability of liability pro-
tection could be determined by the purpose for which the card is 
primarily or most frequently used. Under this standard, occasional 
or insubstantial personal use would not be sufficient to defeat the 
statutory exclusion.154 The test would be most difficult to apply-
and justify-in situations where business and personal uses were 
nearly evenly divided. 
Some cases obviously will raise difficult evidentiary problems. 
The cardholder, who has principal control of the evidence relevant 
to a determination of the purpose of his prior uses, also has a strong 
incentive to characterize his uses to fall within the coverage of the 
statute.155 In addition, when the unauthorized use occurs before the 
card has been used extensively, there may be no pattern of usage 
sufficient to provide evidence of the cardholder's primary purpose 
in securing the card. In this situation, the cardholder's own classifica-
tion of his intention may provide the sole basis for determining 
applicability of the statute. 
153. See 4 CCH CONSUMER Crurorr GumE ,r 30,682 (1971) (excerpts from Fed. Res. Bd. 
letter of June 3, 1971, No. 483, by Griffith L. Garwood). 
154. In most cases, the facts necessary to determine the predominant use can be ob• 
tained by reference to the card.holder's history of use. 
155. There are other considerations apart from the statute that will affect both the 
card.holder's characterization of his use and the availability of tangible evidence of prior 
uses. In many situations, the card.holder will seek to classify charges incurred with a 
credit card as business expenses in order to take advantage of the federal income tax 
deduction. See INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 162(a), 212. In addition, since most business 
deductions must be supported by adequate documentation, the tax law creates an in-
centive for the cardholder to preserve sales slips and other evidence of the nature of 
the transaction. See, e.g., INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 274(d). Thus, with respect to au-
thorized charges, the cardholder will typically have an interest in categorizing his busi-
ness uses as such. However, if a particular card has been misused, the incentives created 
by the tax law may disappear in light of the advantage that the card.holder receives 
from opposite characterization of his uses. While the cardholder's past tax records may 
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As long as a distinction is maintained between business and con-
sumer transactions, there is the potential for confusion among card-
holders regarding the availability of the statutory protection. If he 
were aware of the nonavailability of the liability limitation, a card-
holder might segregate his business card accounts and take special 
measures to protect them from loss. He might, for example, insure 
his business cards or exercise particular care in handling them. It 
would seemingly be appropriate for the Federal Reserve Board to 
devise regulatory measures to protect the cardholder's interest in 
these situations. The Board should require the card issuer to disclose 
the statutory exemption for business use to its cardholders. The is-
suer might also be compelled to offer an option of establishing a 
separate account for business transactions.150 Other protections could 
be achieved through judicial construction of the statute. The issuer 
could be made to bear the burden of shmving that the test for deter-
mining statutory coverage had not been met.167 In addition, an 
issuer who had informed cardholders that they had only limited 
liability for unauthorized use might be precluded from subsequently 
asserting the inapplicability of the statute. Unfortunately, such a 
rule will further reduce the already inadequate incentive for issuer 
participation in the disclosure scheme.168 
Although the treatment of business transactions may be clarified 
by administrative rule-making, the legislative history of the credit 
card provision reveals no explicit recognition of this limitation by 
not be subject to manipulation, there nonetheless will be many situations in which tl1e 
cardholder will respond to the incentive of the credit card law-as where the acquisi• 
tion of a particular card is fairly recent, the cardholder has chosen not to itemize his 
tax deductions, and so on. 
156. While this option may be presently available, the measure suggested would be 
structured to ensure publicity of the option to the business user. 
157. This result draws some support from statutory provisions allocating tl1e burden 
of proof in related controversies. The issuer bears tile burden of showing "tllat tl1e use 
was authorized or, if tlle use was unautllorized ••• tllat tile conditions of liability , •• 
set forth in [§ I643(a)] have been met." 15 U.S.C. § I643(b) (1970), set out in note 34 
supra. While this provision does not address itself to the burden of proof in situations 
not covered by tlle statute, it presents a congressional preference for offering further 
protection to cardholders by requiring issuers to make the aflirmatiye showing of tlleir 
right of recovery. 
It might be argued, of course, tllat Congress intended tllis additional protection to 
apply only when the statute was otllenvise applicable and that, by implication, the 
burden of proof should rest on the cardholder in other situations. However, when the 
issue of statutory coverage is itself in question, it seems consistent witll -tlle general 
congressional design to create a procedural rule tllat will offer ma'Cimum protection to 
cardholders. 
158. See notes 195-208 infra and accompanying text. However, by protecting issuers 
who do accurately explain the limitations on statutory coverage, such a construction 
may make it worthwhile for issuers to disclose openly tile exemption to their card· 
holders. 
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Congress,159 and policy considerations do not necessarily support the 
distinctions drmm between business and personal use. For example, 
the evidentiary difficulties generated by application of the business 
exclusion may impair the efficiency with which cardholder protec-
tions are administered. A more fundamental objection is that the 
business nature of usage does not necessarily provide a rational basis 
for denying the protection of the Act. The potential for burdensome 
cardholder liability may be equally great whether the card is used 
for personal or business purposes. Thus, an individual cardholder 
may be unable to absorb any significant fraud loss regardless of 
whether it flows from a business rather than a personal credit card.160 
While some businesses obligated to accept liability for unauthorized 
uses will be able to spread such losses adequately, that ability is not a 
necessary result of the cardholder's commercial status. Moreover, 
the business nature of the user is irrelevant to the relative capacity 
of the cardholder and issuer to control losses. Even businesses with a 
good loss-spreading potential are likely to be less efficient loss con-
trollers than card issuers.161 
In order to achieve the statutory objective of consumer protec-
tion, the business credit cards of the cardholder should also be 
covered by the statutory liability limitation. Requiring the business-
159. Neither the hearings nor the floor debate indicate that enactment of S. 721 
was undertaken with an appreciation of the effect of the business purpose exemption 
of 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970). Indeed, one source involved in the legislative evolution of 
the Senate bill has implied that no such limitation was intended, utilization of the 
framework of the Truth-in-Lending Act being only a matter of "drafting convenience." 
!16 CONSUMER REPORTS 645 (Nov. 1971). The caption of S. 721 may suggest the contrary, 
however; it describes the bill as one "to safeguard the consumer." S. 721, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1969) (emphasis added). Many of the statements made in support of the measure 
considered only its effect on consumers. See ll6 CoNG. R.Ec. ll828, !10874-77, 30884-85 
(1970), 
While the classification "consumer" need not conclusively denote only personal ac-
tivities to the e.xclusion of those of a business nature, the association has been made 
in both common parlance and unrelated statutes. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 9-109(1) (consumer goods defined as those purchased primarily for personal, family, or 
household use). 
160. In many situations, the cardholder has the attributes of both a businessman 
and a consumer in that he accepts responsibility for both types of transactions. While 
the purpose of the credit card provisions was to afford financial protection to con-
sumers, the protection given the cardholder in his consumer activities may be readily 
undermined by the absence of protection for his business activities. Thus, the consumer 
affairs of the junior executive who loses his business air-travel card may be completely 
disrupted if he has to absorb losses for subsequent unauthorized uses of his card. 
It is true that in most situations charges against business cards of corporate employees 
may initially be paid by the firm. However, since the statute does not prevent the 
corporate cardholder from transferring liability back to the authorized card user, the 
firm may seek to hold the individual employee responsible for card misuse. 
161. Cf. notes 139-44 supra and accompanying text. The card issuer presumably 
could also control business card losses more efficiently. 
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man to bear the responsibility for unauthorized card uses unneces-
sarily muddles the congressional scheme of loss allocation. Since no 
strong policy supports application of the transactional exemption to 
the credit card amendment, the operation of the statute should be 
modified, by congressional amendment or by Federal Reserve Board 
rule, to permit the application of the liability limitation to business 
credit cards. 
2. The Determination of Agency Status 
The three traditional agency concepts of actual, implied, and 
apparent authority are employed to determine those instances when 
cardholders receive the insulation of the limited liability provisions 
of the statute.162 If the unauthorized user of the card does not have 
authority in one of these forms, the cardholder will incur no more 
than fifty dollars liability, provided he secures no benefit from the 
transaction. The use of the agency framework in the credit card 
statute is unfortunate in some respects. Many agency concepts were 
originally developed to characterize relationships created in a busi-
ness context. The relationship that leads to use of a credit card by 
persons other than the cardholder is often much more personal. 
Thus, such concepts as authorization and manifestation suggest a 
formality that does not usually exist in credit card transfers. More-
over, the body of case law that gave rise to agency principles does 
not speak directly to the types of situations in which one relinquishes 
control of a simple, readily accepted credit device. Despite its com-
mercial origins, however, the law of agency does admit of consider-
able flexibility, a characteristic that may ultimately be employed to 
minimize interpretive difficulties. 
The concepts of actual and implied authority are closely re-
lated.163 They refer to the "power of the agent to affect the legal 
relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the prin-
cipal' s manifestations of consent to him."164 The determinant of this 
power, and the characteristic that distinguishes it from apparent au-
thority, is the manifestation made by the principal directly to the 
agent. A specific direction given by the principal creates actual or 
express authority. But often the principal does not specify in detail 
162. 15 U.S.C, § 1602(0) (1970), set out itl note 34 supra. 
163. Indeed, the statutory usage counters a trend to join the two terms under the 
general concept of "authority." See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, comment c 
(1957). 
164. Id. § 7. See also w. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8 (1964). 
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what an agent may properly do; thus, the limitation of the agent's 
authority is often supplied by an inductive process. The principal 
will be bound not only by the transaction that he directly authorized 
his agent to enter, but also by other transactions that were by im-
plication condoned in the original grant. The scope of the power 
that will be implied is determined by the generality of the actual 
manifestation, custom, and the relationship of the parties.165 
Without an initial manifestation by the cardholder, there can 
be no implied authority for use. Consequently, when the actual user 
of the card has stolen the card or picked it up after the cardholder 
has misplaced it, the concepts of actual and implied authority have 
no application. But many situations arise in which the cardholder 
gives someone limited permission to use his card.166 These instances 
may require a determination of the scope of proper uses that may 
reasonably be implied. Since a card may be used to purchase a variety 
of merchandise at a number of outlets, it is necessary to determine 
whether there are limitations on the types of goods and services that 
may be secured, the locations in which the card may be used, the 
amount of charges that may be incurred, or the number of uses that 
are contemplated. Illustratively, assume that A lends B his car and 
gasoline credit card and tells B that he may use the car to take his 
family on a Sunday afternoon pleasure drive. The transfer does not 
give B implied authority to use the card for lodging or to purchase 
food. More difficult questions, however, are whether the card may be 
used for automotive products and services other than routine pur-
chases of gasoline and oil. Since the contemplated trip is of short 
duration, there is probably no implied authority for periodic ser-
vicing, such as oil changes. Should a minor defect develop, such as 
a fiat tire, the card could seemingly be used in order to allow B to 
complete his return trip. But because A's largess did not contemplate 
extended use or expensive purchases, there would likely be no au-
thority to use the card for major repairs. Unfortunately, since the 
initial manifestation of consent for credit card use is often made 
informally, it typically will not produce an extensive statement of 
the user's actual authority. Hence, to determine the extent of im-
plied authority, an attempt must be made to construct a relationship 
between the parties. The multitude of agency cases provide a basis 
for analogies. But, as the above example illustrates, situational pecu-
165. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, comment c (1957). 
166. See Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 S.2d 762 (La. App. 1962): Socony Mobil 
Oil Co. v. Greif, 10 App. Div. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1960); Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
v. McMillan, 168 S.W .2d 881 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1943). 
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liarities will ultimately determine the scope of actual and implied 
authority. 
Actual and implied authority may, however, be of little impor-
tance in the majority of cases involving the limited liability provi-
sion. The concept of apparent authority may make it unnecessary to 
refine precisely the limits of implied authority. Apparent authority, 
like the other agency concepts, is created by a manifestation of the 
principal, but unlike actual and implied authority, the basis of ap-
parent authority is a manifestation to the party with whom the 
agent deals. More specifically, it is an expression that reasonably 
leads the party to believe that the actions of another will bind the 
principal.167 Because the scope of this authority is determined from 
the perspective of the person providing the goods or services, the 
limits of authority to which the principal and agent expressly agreed 
or which may be implied from their relationship are not necessarily 
controlling. Rather, the important factor is the appearance of au-
thority that the principal allows to develop.168 
In many instances of credit card use by persons other than the 
cardholder, the fact that the user was given even a modicum of 
authority to use a card will significantly affect whether the user's 
apparent authority extends beyond the originally intended author-
ization. Despite the absence of direct contact between the cardholder 
and the merchant who honors it, authorized control of the card by 
the user may itself be a sufficient manifestation to others to create an 
obligation in the cardholder. An important element of this creation 
of apparent authority is the cardholder's initial consent to the trans-
fer and use. Thus, although specific agency precedent is lacking, it is 
unlikely that mere possession of the card would be regarded as a 
manifestation attributable to the cardholder where his relinquish-
ment was involuntary, as in the case of theft. 
It is traditionally posited that the agent's possession of property 
may create authority for him to deal with it if "other facts" are 
present.169 Several characteristics of credit card transactions supply 
those facts. The credit card is a device designed to secure goods and 
services upon credit; mere use of the card provides no occasion for 
suspicion by a merchant. Moreover, by custom, credit cards are freely 
accepted in commercial transactions. The cardholder who relin-
quishes possession should reasonably anticipate that the card might 
167. REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF AGENCY § 8, at 13 (1964). 
168. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF AGENCY §§ 27, 49 (1957); w. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 18, 22 (1964). 
169. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 49, comment d (1957). 
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be presented in payment for a wide range of goods or services. When 
he does not intend that result, the cardholder may be obligated to 
take steps to ensure that others are aware of the limitation he in-
tends.170 Therefore, although the cardholder may desire to grant only 
limited authority for use, he should appreciate that once control of 
the card is relinquished little can be done to confine the use of the 
card to those transactions originally contemplated. From the perspec-
tive of the merchant who will be asked to honor the card, authority 
for particular limited uses cannot be distinguished from general 
authority, unless, of course, the merchant has knowledge of other 
circumstances that limit the user's authority.171 
Two cases decided prior to enactment of the federal credit card 
statute suggest a judicial inclination toward this view that the card-
holder bears liability for all reasonable purchases made by another 
who has been given control of the holder's card. In Neiman-Marcus 
Co. v. Viser,172 the cardholder gave his card to his wife upon the 
commencement of their short-lived marriage, and subsequently paid 
for one series of purchases charged against his account. Two months 
later, the couple separated, but three days thereafter the cardholder's 
wife made the additional purchases that were the subject of the liti-
gated collection effort. The court, viewing the Ii.ability question as 
resolved by agency principles, concluded: "The delivery of the 
'Charga-Plate' by Viser to his wife constituted an authorization for 
the purchases made by her and for their charge to his account."173 
170. Results in particular cases will be affected by the user's ability to create an 
appearance of authority by representations of his power to act. See R.EsrATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY §§ 27, comment c, & 165 (1957). Under section 165, the principal is 
liable if the user-agent has apparent authority and subsequently represents to a third 
person that he has authorized control of the card. Id. § 165, comment a. However, the 
principal's liability never arises if the third person has reason to know that the agent 
is not acting for the principal's benefit. Id. § 166, comments c & d. 
171. For example, if an employee of the cardholder has repeatedly used the latter's 
card to purchase gasoline and oil for a company automobile from a particular service 
station operator, the limited nature of these purchases may negate the reasonableness 
of a belief by the operator that the employee has authority to use the card to purchase 
service for his own automobile. But as to other merchants with whom the employee 
has not previously dealt, authorized possession of the card may be a manifestation suffi-
cient to support liability for most other uses. Other limitations upon cardholder re-
sponsibility may appear in particular circumstances. The nature of typical credit card 
uses presents one such limitation. While a card potentially might be used to acquire 
anything that an issuer may permit, custom suggests that a merchant should conclude 
that there is apparent authority only for purchases that are not of abnormal size or 
frequency in relation to the likely consumption patterns of the nominal cardholder. 
Hence, if the user made many large transactions in a short period of time, or bought 
goods in unusual quantities, it might be found that the cardholder's manifestation 
could not reasonably encompass such transactions. Cf. Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
433 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). 
172. 140 S.2d 762 (La, App. 1962). 
173. 140 S.2d at 765. 
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Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan174 reaches a similar result with 
respect to charges made by two persons to whom the cardholder had 
given his oil company card. Although initial charges made against 
the card were for the benefit of the holder, the cardholder unsuc-
cessfully resisted liability for purchases for which he received no 
benefit and that were made after he attempted to dissuade his trans-
ferees from continued use of the card.176 In both of these cases, the 
court held the cardholder liable despite violation of express or im-
plicit limitations upon the scope of permissible uses of the actual 
user. Having knowingly and approvingly relinquished control of a 
credit card, the cardholder was responsible for all charges until he 
took appropriate action to terminate the apparent authority. Because 
it incorporates the concept of apparent authority, the federal credit 
card law is likely to be applied with a similar analytical result. 
3. Unauthorized but Beneficial Use 
A superficial reading of the statute suggests that if the issuer 
has complied with the statutory requirements, a cardholder has some 
liability for all subsequent uses of his card. Under this construction, 
the extent of cardholder liability is dependent upon whether the 
use is unauthorized. If it is unauthorized, the cardholder is re-
sponsible for no more than fifty dollars of the charges improperly 
made. It would seem to follow that if the transaction is not un-
authorized, the cardholder bears full liability even though the 
transaction involves use of the card by a third party. While this 
assessment of credit card liability has the seeming certainty of obvi-
ousness, a closer analysis reveals that there may be intermediate 
situations in which a use does not meet the statutory definition of 
unauthorized use, but nonetheless does not warrant the imposition 
of liability on the cardholder for the total value of the transaction. 
The statute establishes a conjunctive relationship between the 
absence of authority and benefit to the cardholder; a use is "un-
authorized" by statutory definition only if undertaken by another 
party acting without authority and if the cardholder receives no 
benefit.176 It follows by implication that an "authorized" use is either 
one in which the user has authority or one from which the card-
holder receives benefit. Thus, the statute can be read to mean 
174. 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). 
175. The court did not frame the relationship of the cardholder and his transferees 
in agency terms. Moreover, the decision was aided by a contract term that obligated 
the holder for all charges made prior to the return of the card. 168 S.W.2d at 881. 
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
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that the mere receipt of benefit from another's unauthorized use, 
even when conferred without authority, obligates the cardholder to 
reimburse the issuer. Under this interpretation, the extent of card-
holder liability would not be subject to the statutory limitation be-
cause the definition of an unauthorized use would not have been 
satisfied; while there was no authority for the use, the situation was 
not one "from which the cardholder receives no benefit."177 Hence, 
this view seemingly presumes that the cardholder's liability would 
extend to the full amount of the charges. 
Despite the symmetry of this interpretation, courts should avoid 
the temptation to base a finding of full liability upon the mere re-
ceipt of benefit by the cardholder. Such an interpretation can be 
rejected on a number of grounds. Properly viewed, the statute was 
not intended as a complete guide for determining the liability of a 
cardholder for transactions undertaken with his card by other per-
sons. The credit card legislation is not designed as a comprehensive 
statement of cardholder liability for authorized transactions; rather, 
the definitions were structured to deal only with problems peculiar 
to unauthorized uses. Significantly, the legislative history of the mea-
sure indicates no congressional intention to impose full liability for 
misuses simply because they produce benefit. Drafters of the legis-
latfon apparently assumed that a cardholder would have at most 
only partial liability for the fraudulent diversion of his card.178 Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the notion that mere receipt of benefit 
renders one fully liable runs counter to significant-and desirable 
-precedent that has developed under the law of restitution. If a 
benefit is not returnable, as will most likely be the case when credit 
card purchases are involved,179 there is considerable support for re-
lieving the unsuspecting beneficiary of liability. It is generally ac-
cepted that while an individual who himself secures services from 
another by fraud is clearly accountable, one receiving nonreturnable 
benefits of another's fraud incurs no liability.180 Other more general 
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
178. See S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970); 116 CoNG. REc. 11829-30, 
11842 (1970) (comments of Senators Proxmire and Percy). 
179. Although precise statistics on the types of purchases made with credit cards 
are not available, many of the purchases made by unauthorized users will either be 
services that arc immediately consumed or goods that the user appropriates for himself. 
Neither of these situations presents the interpretive difficulty discussed here. Illustrative 
of the definitional problem, however, is a case in which the unauthorized user secures 
repairs or services for the cardholder's property-his car, appliances, or similar items. 
Such a case will most probably involve an unauthorized user who is a member of the 
cardholdcr's family, a fact that may justify the application of principles other than 
those discussed in the text. See notes 185-86 infra and accompanying text. 
180. See REsrATEMENT OF REsnTurION § 40, comment b (1936). This conclusion is 
underscored by an illustration to comment b: 
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principles confirm this result. Thus, liability for restitution will not 
be found if the cardholder-beneficiary did not have an opportunity 
to decline the benefit before it was performed,181 to negotiate the 
terms of the performance,182 or to disaffirm the performance after 
its completion.183 A similar result can be expected if the benefit did 
not satisfy a legal or moral obligation of the cardholder.184 
Most situations involving unauthorized card use will not raise 
the question of the effect of the cardholder's receipt of benefit. When 
it does arise, it will likely involve an unauthorized user who is a 
member of the cardholder's family. Unfortunately, the statute is 
particularly susceptible to an erroneous reading in this situation. 
Many issuers apparently feel that a cardholder should be held respon-
sible for misuse of his card by anyone within his household. Indeed, 
an issuers' association has suggested that the reference to an absence 
of benefit in the definition of "unauthorized use" was intended to 
exclude from the statute uses "by a member of the family or house-
hold of the cardholder."185 There is, however, no evidence that such 
misuses were intended to be excluded as a class. The mere fact of a 
familial relationship between cardholder and user does not suggest 
a basis for imposing liability, and these cases should be treated under 
the same principle that governs other applications of the statute. The 
cardholder will be liable in many of these situations because the 
family member's use is accompanied by sufficient indicia of authority 
to bind the cardholder. Other cases may present facts that justify 
imposing full liability upon the cardholder, as where the unau-
Representing that he is the employment agent of A, but in fact without power to 
bind A, B employs C to remodel A's house in A's absence. A has never requested 
such work to be done. C is not entitled to restitution from A for the value of 
work upon or materials incorporated into A's house. 
While a few cases suggest a contrary result (see, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Obeme, 121 
ill. 25, 7 N.E. 85 (1886)), most are in agreement. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Ford, 188 Md. 
658, 53 A.2d 665 (1947); Davis Estate v. West Clayton Realty Co., 338 Mo. 69, 89 
S.W.2d 22 (1935); Green v. Messing, 236 App. Div. 107, 258 N.Y.S. 82 (1932); Cascaden 
v. Magryta, 247 Mich. 267, 225 N.W. 511 (1929). 
181. See Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND, L. 
REv. 1183, 1198-99 (1966). 
182. See R.EsrATEMENT OF R.EsrITUTION § 40, comment a (1936). 
183. Id. § 40, comment b. 
184. Id. §§ 40(d), 112-17 (1936). 
185. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 156, 159 (statement of Midwest Dank 
Card System, Inc.). Issuers and their attorneys have recognized the special problems 
raised by intrafamily disputes involving credit cards. See, e.g., R. CLONTZ, TRUTIMN• 
!.ENDING MANUAL 210-11 (Supp. 1972); Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the 
Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 8ll, 830 (1967); Soutl1, Legal 
Steps and Pitfalls in Bank Credit Cards, 87 BANKING L.J. 222, 236-37 (1971); 1969 
Senate Hearings, supra, at 103, 106 (testimony of Thomas Bailey, American Bankers 
Association). 
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thorized family user secures necessities that the cardholder might 
have otherwise been obligated to provide.186 But these can be dealt 
with under general agency and restitutory concepts, and do not 
undermine the broad principle that the statute is not properly 
read as giving rise to general cardholder liability upon mere receipt 
of benefit. 
The question remains as to what the cardholder's liability should 
be for another's use which, although without authority, produces a 
nonreturnable benefit to the cardholder. While, as suggested above, 
total liability is inappropriate, the cardholder's liability cannot be 
limited by a literal application of the statutory provisions because 
the presence of benefit means that the use is not "unauthorized." 
It might be held that the cardholder has no liability at all, but this 
result is anomalous in light of the whole liability scheme of the 
statute that allows the imposition of a portion of fraudulent charges 
on the cardholder. Instead, the statutory reference to "benefit" could 
be construed in a restrictive sense to mean only such benefit as would 
give rise to a restitutory obligation. Thus, a use would be unau-
thorized, and subject to the statute, if it were without authority 
and produced no benefit for which the cardholder would be obli-
gated under general principles of restitution. Because this construc-
tion is not evident from the face of the statute, there, is a substantial 
possibility that it would not be uniformly applied. Hence, the most 
certain solution would be an amendment to the statute incorporating 
this restitutory concept of benefit. 
4. The Role of Negligence 
The above discussion suggests that a cardholder would not often 
be protected by the limited liability provisions for purchases made 
by a person having authorized control of the holder's card. Among 
the policy considerations supporting this conclusion is the fact that 
the cardholder's initial relinquishment of control provides the occa-
sion for the subsequent misuse. Transfers of control that are not 
purely voluntary raise similar questions as to whether lesser degrees 
of cardholder participation in a transfer justify the imposition of 
full liability upon him. For example, when an unauthorized user 
comes into control of the card after it has been lost or misplaced 
by the cardholder, it might be argued that the cardholder has con-
tributed to the subsequent financial loss to the extent that he failed 
to exercise reasonable care in protecting the card. A similar "con-
186. See South, supra note 185, at 236-37. 
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tribution" to loss may arise from the cardholder's failure to act in a 
reasonable manner in notifying the issuer of loss or theft. The 
question raised by these possibilities is whether there is some degree 
of cardholder negligence that removes the protection of the statutory 
limited-liability provisions in the event of loss or theft. The statute 
provides no definitive guide to the resolution of this question.187 
But, while the limited-liability provisions received little attention 
in the hearings and floor debate, the broad objectives and manner 
of implementation of the limitation afford a basis for defining the 
consequences of cardholder negligence. 
In other statutory schemes, an individual's failure to give prompt 
notice following loss has particular significance. Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, for example, a customer who receives a bank 
statement of his checking account that includes forged items "must 
exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement 
and items to discover [forgeries and alterations] and must notify the 
bank promptly after discovery thereof."188 While it has been argued 
that a cardholder should be bound to a similar duty of notification,189 
the limited-liability scheme does not appear to adopt this approach, 
although it does address the consequences of delayed notification of 
loss. As noted above, the statutory provisions encourage the card-
holder to notify the issuer immediately following loss or theft: while 
his maximum liability is othenvise fifty dollars, prompt notification 
may limit actual liability to a lesser sum-the amount of unautho-
rized purchases made before notice.100 At the same time, the statute 
187. A close reading of the statute indicates not only an absence of language 
dealing with the significance of a card loss resulting from the negligence of the 
cardholder, but also some mild inconsistency in the loss events that are identified as 
subject to the &tatute. For example, it is provided that the issuer must supply a 
prcstamped, self-addressed loss notification form to be used "in the event of loss or 
theft of the credit card." 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970) (emphasis added), On the other 
hand, the cardholder has liability only for unauthorized use occurring before he has 
notified the issuer that such a use may occur "as a result of loss, the/ t, or otherwise." 
Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the criminal sanction for misuse of a credit card applies 
to any "counterfeit, fictitious, altered, forged, lost, stolen, or fraudulently obtained 
credit card." 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1970) (emphasis added). 
188. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4--406(1). This can be compared with section 
8-405(1), which provides that where a security has been lost, apparently destroyed, or 
wrongfully taken, the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within a reasonable 
time after he has notice of it, and the issuer registers a transfer of the security before re• 
ceiving notification, the owner is precluded from asserting any claim against the 
issuer for registering a transfer of the security or any claim to a new security, 
189. See :Bergsten, supra note 2, at 507. 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. Congress apparently under• 
stood that this scheme of inc~nUy1,3 would appropriately stimulate the dcs.trcd :(esponse. 
See text at note 145 supra, 
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imposes liability upon all who fail to meet the time restnctlon 
without regard to the quality of their conduct; those who are un-
aware of the opportunity to limit liability further are treated the 
same as those who consciously choose not to provide notice. Not only 
is the statute silent on the impact of the motive or excuse for in-
action, but the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency rejected 
a proposed modification that would have further penalized a par-
ticular variety of cardholder neglect.191 The injection of negligence 
principles is therefore an interference with the congressional design. 
Because the statute directly confronts the problem of delayed notice 
and provides a complete system for allocating loss, this should be 
regarded as the exclusive mechanism for loss distribution. 
Many of the considerations militating against increased card-
holder liability for a negligent failure to give notice of loss also 
suggest that the cardholder's negligence in the initial loss of the card 
does not affect the availability of statutory protection. The statutory 
language, for example, places no qualification on the type of card 
loss that will be protected, but instead is absolute in its application. 
Moreover, with respect to both types of negligence, the apparent 
congressional choice was in favor of a system of specifically defined 
liability limits. Such a system has the advantage of certainty for both 
the issuer and cardholder and, to the extent it is readily adminis-
trable, ensures effectuation of congressional policy. If exceptions 
were made for various degrees of negligent conduct, several unde-
sirable results would follow. An approach based on negligence would 
not, for example, allay cardholder concern for potential liability 
from credit card use because cardholders would continue to have 
only imprecise guides for determining their potential liability.192 
Moreover, the resultant disputes over the proper classification of the 
cardholder's conduct invite overstatement and coercion by an issuer 
attempting to maximize recovery. Consumer uncertainty is mini-
191. The Committee minority had suggested that protection from liability not be 
extended to a person who had "purposely refrained from informing the issuer of 
misuse about which he had actual knowledge." S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 
(1970). This proposal was not accepted, and the Committee-endorsed measure made no 
inroads on the breadth of statutory coverage. 
192. Senator Proxmire, the sponsor of the bill, expressed particular concern for the 
"psychological burden" that the threat of liability places on an individual. 116 CONG. 
REc. 11829 (1970). While this remark was made in specific reference to unwanted 
unsolicited cards, a similar concern seems implicit in the attempt to limit potential 
liability of all cards. For example, the floor amendment that shifted the burden of 
proving liability to the issuer was regarded as a necessary complement to the limited• 
liability provision's objective of relieving the cardholder of inconvenience, expense, and 
injury to his credit standing. Id. at 11831 (remarks of Senator McIntyre). 
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mized if the liability system provides a clear standard for loss alloca-
tion. Finally, because of the legal nature of determining acceptable 
cardholder conduct, a fault system would attract the intervention of 
attorneys, and consequently increase the expenses incurred by card-
holders. 
The statute, if applied according to its literal terms, avoids these 
results and allows cardholders to make a clear appraisal of the risks 
of credit card use. The advantages of the limited-liability scheme 
are found in the certainty of its apportionment of liability. The 
introduction of fault concepts would substantially impede the pro-
gress that otherwise could be made toward reducing the potential 
for inconvenience and expense to which cardholders were formerly 
exposed. 
C. Implementation of the Statutory Scheme 
In order to effectuate the limited-liability provisions, the credit 
card statute is designed to inform cardholders about the manner by 
which liability is determined under the new rules. The dissemination 
of such information to cardholders is desirable for a number of rea-
sons. A basic concern, of course, is that cardholders not reimburse 
issuers for amounts in excess of the statutory limits. This objective 
could not be achieved by reliance solely on issuer self-enforcement 
of the liability limitation. If a cardholder voluntarily paid for un-
authorized charges on the assumption that he was liable for them, 
the issuer may not have any means by which to identify the un-
necessary payment since, without cardholder notification, the issuer 
would often be unable to recognize unauthorized transactions.103 
Sole reliance on the issuer's observance of the statutory limitation also 
creates the risk that the issuer will not interpret and apply the statute 
with proper concern for the protection that Congress intended to 
afford cardholders. While provision is made for administrative con-
193. The risk of a voluntary, but unnecessary, payment by a cardholder seems 
particularly great when the unauthorized use is made by a relative or employee of 
the cardholder. The cardholder may assume that his relationship to, and perhaps 
control over, the unauthorized user in these cases make him responsible for charges 
incurred. Whether that is the case under the statute, however, depends ultimately on 
the establishment of an agency relationship concerning use of the card itself. Even 
with some information about the statute, the cardholder may still not be equipped 
to make a knowledgeable assessment of his liability in these cases, particularly when 
the issuer does not attempt to define "unauthorized use,'' as he is not required to do 
under Federal Reserve System guidelines. See 36 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1971). An awareness 
of the basic operation of the liability limitation should, however, increase the likelihood 
that the cardholder will dispute his liability for charges made by others and avoid an 
unquestioning reimbursement of the issuer. 
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trols that could prevent overreaching by issuers,104 most controversies 
arising under the statute will be settled informally between card-
holder and issuer. The cardholder who is equipped with some infor-
mation about the statute will be in a better position to protect his 
interest without resorting to more expensive, and perhaps even un-
necessary, procedures. Even when the issuer has taken the steps neces-
sary to impose limited liability after loss of a card, the cardholder 
may be able to reduce his potential liability still further simply by 
notifying the issuer; he need not notify individual merchants nor 
attempt to retrieve the card. Moreover, the cardholder informed 
about the Act need not incur the inconvenience of giving notice of 
loss when such notice is unnecessary to prevent liability-for example, 
when the issuer has not complied with the prerequisites to imposition 
of limited cardholder liability. It is likely, of course, that the card-
holder will eventually notify a noncomplying issuer of the loss of a 
card, if for no other reason than to have his account corrected and 
a new card issued. But if he appreciates the protection offered by the 
statute, the cardholder may be able to do so in a manner minimizing 
his personal inconvenience. 
Unfortunately, although issuers are assigned a primary role in 
disseminating information about the operation of the liability lim-
itation, issuer participation in the information system is not manda-
tory. In the congressional design, the opportunity to impose liability 
up to fifty dollars is intended to provide the necessary incentive for 
issuer compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act. The 
issuer might comply with the statute for two possible reasons: (1) 
to limit its own financial loss by assessing its cardholders for their 
maximum liability under the statute, or (2) to use the threat of 
potential liability to prompt the cardholder to exercise care in the 
control of his card and to notify the issuer in the event of loss. 
Further analysis suggests that the first consideration is not likely to 
be important to most issuers and that the impact of the second is 
uncertain at best. The consequence is that the statutory objective 
will not be readily achieved, and cardholders will continue to endure 
some of the detrimental consequences that flow from an imperfect 
perception of their liability for unauthorized card use. 
An issuer's eagerness to assess cardholders a portion of its fraud 
losses will be influenced by indirect as well as direct economic con-
siderations. Experience prior to the statute is instructive in this re-
194. 15 u.s.c. § 1607 (1970). 
1530 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1475 
gard. Issuers commonly framed cardholder agreements to impose 
cardholder liability for all unauthorized charges incurred prior to 
the receipt of notice by the issuer of the loss or theft of a card.10u 
Yet, apparently few issuers took advantage of the right of recovery 
that they had preserved in the cardholder agreement. One indication 
of issuer hesitancy to hold cardholders liable for fraud losses is the 
infrequency with which issuer collection actions ultimately resulted 
in judicial decisions. Although credit cards and related devices have 
existed since the early part of the century, the number of cases con-
sidering the issue of cardholder liability is small. By 1967 there 
were only twenty reported decisions196 and few have appeared since 
then.197 The absence of reported decisions, of course, does not neces-
sarily establish that issuers did not attempt collections by measures 
short of litigation, a possibility that requires further analysis. 
While there is evidence that some issuers did attempt to secure 
reimbursement from cardholders, the extent of these practices was 
probably limited, despite contrary suggestions.198 The hearings on the 
195. See text accompanying note 136 supra. 
196. See llergsten, supra note 2, at 488-97, for a review of the cases. 
197. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1086 (1967) & Supp. (1971) at 17-18. 
198. One commentator concluded: "Apparently about half of the issuers try to 
recover and are successful in 30 to 50 per cent of their attempts." Note, supra note 
100, at 1426 n.49. The author cites an interview with a New Haven issuer and an 
empirical study at the University of Miami: Murray, supra note 185, at 830, The 
author of a subsequent article states: "Estimates of collections on unpaid credit card 
debts without suit vary from 30% to 50%." Kennedy, supra note 33, at 32, This 
author's sources are the same as those of the earlier Note. 
The results of the University of Miami study, conducted by Professor Daniel E. 
Murray, are at best inconclusive on this question. The survey included responses from 
several types of issuers. The responses of nine oil companies were summarized as 
follows: 
In response to the author's inquiry as to what percentage of holders have paid 
voluntarily and what percentage did so after suit was filed • • • only two 
companies attempted an answer. One company reported that approximately 30 
per cent of its holders made payment for unauthorized charges without suit 
being filed, while the other company said that 2 per cent of its holders paid 
without suit being filed and less than 1 per cent did so after suit was filed, 
Murray, supra note 185, at 830. The report on the four airlines that responded to the 
survey was: "One airline reported that approximately 50 percent of its card l1oldcrs 
voluntarily paid for unauthorized charges without any suit being filed." Id. at 833, Five 
independent issuers (American E.xpress Co., General Electric Credit Corp., Carte 
lllanche Corp., Diners' Club and Playboy Clubs Intl.) were surveyed. The author 
reported: "Two of these companies stated that approximately one half of their holders 
paid for unauthorized charges made against their cards before trial and the remaining 
one half after trial." Id. at 834. In each group of respondents, some firms did not give 
an answer to the specific question. 
It was not determined whether the percentage of the firms that attempted collec• 
tions was representative of industry practice. Other sources report that most issuers 
did not pursue this practice. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 6. Moreover, 
the survey did not determine whether firms that pursued collection efforts attempted 
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credit card legislation did not include a detailed inquiry into these 
industry practices, and other sources yield no conclusive data on the 
matter. There are, however, a number of instances in which industry 
representatives and others have recognized that issuers typically did 
not attempt to charge cardholders for unauthorized uses.199 Credit 
card firms explain this ·willingness to absorb fraud losses in terms of 
protecting customer good will. The adverse publicity resulting from 
a rigorous enforcement policy is likely to have a significant effect on 
the issuer's competitive position, especially if other issuers adhere 
to a policy of not assessing fraud losses against their cardholders. 
Such publicity would also heighten the general awareness of the 
dangers of credit card use, thereby adversely affecting the public's 
receptiveness to credit cards.200 Equally significantly, collection tech-
niques involving litigation or significant manpower expenditures 
probably cannot be justified by issuers in most cases because the 
amount of loss is small.201 The collective impact of these considera-
tions led most issuers to absorb their fraud losses, despite the con-
tinued use of agreement terms purporting to relieve the cardholder 
of liability only after notice. 
In light of the industry practice that prevailed, it would seem 
that few issuers will take the required statutory steps solely in order 
to shift a portion of their fraud losses to cardholders. An issuer's 
compliance with the statutory requirements would result in addi-
tional costs,202 while the issuer's potential recovery is now limited 
to a maximum of fifty dollars. Those issuers who previously chose 
them in all cases. Considerations such as the size of the cardholder's account balance 
and his propensity toward a retaliatory suit suggest that such action would sometimes 
be imprudent. 
199. Many issuers took this position in the congressional hearings. See, e.g., 1970 
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 91 (testimony of Earl Pollock, Midwest Bank Card 
System, Inc.); id. at 215 (statement of Clifford Venarde, Shell Oil Co.). See also 1968 
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 2, 4-5 (statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System); South, supra note 185, at 226. 
200. The credit manager of an oil company reported: "Every time the papers report 
customer losses on stolen credit cards we get hundreds of credit cards returned to us." 
1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 217, 218 reprinting NATL. PETROLEUM NEWS, 
April 1967. 
201. In a survey of several large oil companies, it was found that the amount of 
unauthorized charges against lost cards averaged $151. One issuer (a bank) indicated 
that it experienced only a $38 average loss. See Murray, supra note 185, at 829, 836. 
202. The issuer must draft, publish, and distribute both the required notices and 
the self-addressed, prestamped loss notification form. In addition, new security systems 
must be devised to handle card returns, inquiries, and requests for replacement cards. 
Moreover, many issuers would have to develop a new format for their cards in order 
to meet the statutory requirement of inclusion of a reasonable identification device. 
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not to press for cardholder liability are not likely to incur additional 
costs solely to preserve a right to a recovery that they did not intend 
to exercise. Similarly, those few issuers who sought reimbursement 
from cardholders will now be discouraged from such action by the 
limitation placed on the potential recovery. Without the likelihood 
of a recovery sufficient to cover collection costs, formal enforcement 
actions are unlikely, and measures short of litigation should also be 
curtailed. 
Even absent an expectation of shifting some portion of fraud 
losses to cardholders, an issuer will be concerned that cardholders 
both protect their cards from loss and give notice in the event of their 
loss. This kind of care could be encouraged if the issuer satisfied 
the limited-liability requirements to continue the threat of potential 
liability in the event of unauthorized use. But it is possible that the 
desired cardholder care might be forthcoming even if an issuer does 
not meet the statutory prerequisites for limited cardholder liability. 
Issuers have made a concerted effort to foster the notion among 
cardholders that liability may attend the loss of a credit card,208 and 
this notion is likely to linger despite the enactment of S. 721. Even 
apart from this consideration, issuers would have the benefit of a 
natural tendency among cardholders to approach their financial 
dealings with a concern for potential injury.204 Absent clear infor-
mation to the contrary, a cardholder's probable reaction to the loss 
of his card will be one of concern. While the cardholder may be 
uncertain about his legal liability for unauthorized charges, the 
situation is likely to be viewed as calling for protective measures; 
the most logical step to minimize the prospects of liability is to in-
form the issuer of the loss of the card. 
In evaluating whether to incur the cost of providing cardholders 
with information about the statute, the issuer must assess the extent 
to which it may otherwise be the beneficiary of a cardholder's 
natural or industry-generated concern for potential liability. The 
issuer may not always decide that its interests are protected without 
compliance with the statute, for the relevant factors are not suscep-
203. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra. 
204. It has been recognized by enforcement personnel that issuers might attempt 
to rely on a tendency among cardholders to overestimate their potential liability and, 
hence, to avoid disclosure of the operation of the statute. Staff members "at the FTC's 
Division of Consumer Credit and Special Programs say that most companies have a lot 
to gain by keeping their customers uninformed. If a cardholder knows that his 
liability is limited to $50, for example, he may not be so prompt in letting the com• 
pany know when he finds that his card is missing." TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 80. 
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tible to precise definition. In addition, if the desired response is not 
forthcoming from its cardholders, the risk that the issuer faces is 
substantial. The point is that the issuers' responses will reflect the 
incentives that the statute provides. Because the incentives that 
Congress created are not strong, the degree of issuer compliance 
will be uneven. Unless the disclosure system is restructured, many 
issuers will choose not to take advantage of the opportunity to im-
pose limited liability on cardholders. They will be content to create 
the impression of potential liability and thereby stimulate card-
holders to protect their cards, but stop short of doing all that would 
technically be necessary to impose liability. Hence, issuer disclosure 
of information about the statute may be limited to a cursory state-
ment of potential liability.205 Even those issuers who choose to meet 
the statutory requirements are not likely to regard their compliance 
as requiring any immediate action; the timing of the statutory disclo-
sures might be geared to other changes in the issuer's program, such 
as the redesign or reissuance of cards. 
The response of credit card companies since the enactment of the 
credit card provisions confirms that the statute provides at best a 
limited incentive for issuer participation in the information dis-
205. The response of one major oil company illustrates this type of situation. The 
issuer distributed information intended to correct statements on its outstanding cards 
to the effect that the cardholder had liability for all unauthorized charges made prior 
to notification of loss. The issuer's disclosure took this form: 
IMPORTANT NOTICE 
CHANGE IN CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT 
You may have a credit card which, contrary to the provisions of the Truth in 
Lending Act, overstates your liability for the unauthorized use of your card. 
All provisions appearing on your credit card which impose liability in excess of 
that imposed by the terms of the Truth in Lending Act are hereby deleted. Your 
liability for unauthorized use under the Truth in Lending Act can, in no event, 
exceed $50.00. 
American Oil Co., Notice, November 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review. This 
disclosure is not sufficient to permit the issuer to impose any liability on cardholders. 
It fails to make clear the "pertinent facts" about the operation of the statute, as is 
required by the Truth-in-Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1602G) (1970), set out in note 34 
supra. The cardholder is not told the circumstances in which his liability may be less 
than fifty dollars. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. Moreover, 
while the issuer distributed a notification-of-loss form, it was not prestamped as 
required by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970). Although the statement of maximum 
liability is a correct generalization about the Act, it does not accurately assess the card-
holder's liability; he bears no liability in any amount for the unauthorized use of this 
issuer's cards. But it may be unimportant to the issuer that it will not be able to 
recover from its cardholders. Its disclosure will cause most cardholders to believe that 
some liability may be imposed; hence, they will be likely to exercise care with their 
card and to give notice to the issuer in the event of loss in order to minimize that 
perceived liability. 
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semination scheme. In the first year following enactment of the 
statute, only a very few firms gave any public recognition to the 
new rules for determining cardholder liability. This delayed initial 
reaction occurred even though the consequence to noncomplying 
issuers was the elimination of any right to demand notice from card-
holders or reimbursement for unauthorized charges. Since the initial 
period, the number of issuers distributing information about the 
statute has increased.200 Nevertheless, it remains clear that many 
issuers still prefer to operate without preserving their right to im-
pose liability within the statutory limits. Their response is evidently 
not evoked by the statute's supposed incentive. 
206. An informal survey, by the author, of thirty issuers indicates that in the first 
year after enactment, only two took steps to comply with the conditions for imposing 
limited liability on cardholders. An additional ten issuers have since distributed 
information about the statute, but in only four of these additional cases was the 
disclosure sufficient to impose liability on the cardholder. In the other situations, the 
disclosure was intended to point out the invalidity of statements on the issuers' cards 
that purported to impose greater liability on the cardholder than is permitted under 
the statute. 
The survey included four cards issued by retail department stores. Interestingly, 
none of these issuers had responded to the statute, although other classes of issuers 
were not as uniform. While the survey is sufficiently unscientific to render any 
generalizations suspect, it may be that many relatively small retailer-issuers wci:e not 
responding to the statute because of the greater cost per unit of compliance and 
their greater control over the security of their cards resulting from the limited 
number of outlets at which they were accepted. 
A similarly unsystematic, but perhaps somewhat more comprehensive, survey was 
conducted among issuers of bank cards. These results confirm an absence of enthusiasm 
among banks to take steps to impose liability on cardholders. Between forty and fifty 
banks in the twelve Federal Reserve Districts were asked if they were aware of 
instances in which a bank attempted to assess the fifty-dollar liability limit against a 
credit card user. In all but two districts, there were no reported instances of collection 
attempts. In those districts where enforcement activity was reported, action was taken 
by only a few banks. Brimmer Paper, supra note 45, at 20-26. 
The report of this survey does not clearly specify whether the banks had chosen 
not to satisfy the statutory requisites for imposing limited liability, or whether they 
had made the necessary disclosures but then decided not to seek the recovery allowed 
by the statute. Several responses suggest that the banks had not complied with the 
requirements. In the Dallas district, for example, it was reported that "[i)n general, 
little has been done to formulate a policy for operating under the $50 rule of the 
October 26 legislation. Typically, the legislation has not resulted in any change in 
banks' operations with respect to unauthorized use of credit cards." Id. at 25. Similarly, 
only one bank in the New York district "is sending a pre-printed notification form to 
customers as required by the amendment to Regulation Z." Id. at 22, 
A number of reasons are identified for the banks' decision to absorb fraud losses. 
In one district "public relations and other competitive reasons" were cited. Id. at 22. In 
the Richmond district, "it appears to be the consensus among banks that attempting 
to assess the loss will probably not be worth the cost in the long run." Id. at 24. 
An inquiry by the Federal Trade Commission further confirmed the failure of the 
statute to attract widespread issuer participation. "According to the FTC, none of the 
major card companies have presented evidence that it is complying with the provisions 
of (the statute]." TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 78. Plans by some large issuers to infonn 
their cardholders of the act were noted, however. Id. at 80. 
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In other cases, even after enactment of the statute, many issuers 
continued to distribute materials that stated conditions of card-
holder liability in the same terms used prior to the statute.207 These 
provisions overstating the cardholder's potential liability were not 
enforceable under the statute, but neither was their inclusion in 
agreements specifically prohibited. The continued dissemination of 
this information, however, did create the risk that cardholders might 
unnecessarily reimburse the issuer for losses, and thus is contrary to 
the spirit of a statute intended to place cardholder liability within 
well-defined limits. Apparently recognizing that this conflict might 
lead to administrative regulation, some issuers have undertaken 
to correct the erroneous impression fostered by credit card agree-
ments. 208 
These attempts to correct clearly erroneous statements, even if 
made without an intention to meet the statutory prerequisites for 
cardholder liability, still have the desirable effect of increasing card-
holder awareness of the statute. There are, however, obvious diffi-
culties with a situation in which the consumer is given information 
that contradicts his credit card agreement. In most cases, the dis-
claimer of liability did not have the same prominence as the im-
proper language, as the correcting language was often in a form 
neither as durable nor as noticeable as the announcement of liability 
printed on the card itself. Consequently, the issuer's original over-
statement of liability may continue to have some effect, and thus 
perpetuate consumer acceptance of a liability system that the statute 
legally reverses. Another risk, perhaps less systematic in nature, is 
that the information conveyed by the disclaimer will give an in-
complete description of the operation of the statute. As is suggested 
by the disclaimer forms actually used by some issuers, the cardholder 
may be prompted to take action that is not required by the statute, 
either in making reimbursement or giving notice.209 
207. In most cases, the continued distribution of these statements was probably a 
result of attempts by issuers to exhaust existing supplies of cards and cardholder 
agreements, which had been prepared prior to passage of the statute. 
208. E.g., disclosure of American Oil Co., supra note 205. See also note 206 supra. 
209. For example, one of the two major bank credit franchises has distributed a 
printed form that advises recipients to disregard a legend on its credit cards stating 
that the cardholder bears full liability for all unauthorized uses that occur prior to 
notification of loss or theft of a card. The form also sets out the statutory requirements 
for imposing partial liability on the cardholder. The form fails to state, however, 
whether the issuer has complied with the terms of the statute. Master Charge Dis-
closure Form, September 1971, on file with the Michigan Law Review. See also note 
205 supra. 
Cardholders receiving this information are likely to be confused about the extent 
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This type of confusion is understandable during the period im-
mediately following adoption of the statute since outstanding cards 
and literature had been drafted on the basis of prestatutory law. 
But even allowing for an issuer's desire to use up existing supplies 
of materials, the likely encroachment upon the statutory design by 
the continued distribution of contradictory materials provides a basis 
for concern. The Federal Reserve Board eventually issued an in-
formal ruling that designated January 25, 1972, as the cut-off date 
for the distribution of credit card materials that misstated cardholder 
liability;210 in a subsequent clarification, it stated that the mere 
inclusion of a corrective statement would not be sufficient to vali-
date the use of dated materials.211 No action has yet been taken to 
require the recall of outstanding cards that misstate liability; it is 
apparently expected that normal attrition through expiration and 
reissuance of current cards will eventually lead to the elimination 
of these materials.212 
A matter of more enduring concern is the absence of a provision 
making mandatory the disclosure of information about the liability 
limitations. The statute permits the issuer to leave the cardholder 
without any indication of his responsibility either to give notice of 
loss or to reimburse the issuer for the fraudulent use of his card. 
The operation of the statute in this regard is somewhat curious for 
it seems to reflect a basic inconsistency in the apparent legislative 
policy underlying the provision. On the one hand, Congress recog-
nized that it is not enough to change the rules for cardholder liabil-
ity without informing cardholders of the new loss-allocation system. 
Yet, at the same time, this recognition is given only limited expres-
sion since an issuer is required to explain the limits of its right to 
of their liability. The manner in which this information is presented may lead some 
cardholders to believe that the fifty-dollar liability applies to them, The statement may 
therefore prompt cardholders to give the issuer notification of loss to which it is not 
entitled. In other cases, the cardholder may unquestioningly reimburse the issuer for 
unauthorized charges of less than fifty dollars. To the extent that issuers encourage--
even unintentionally-this gratuitous response by cardholders, the statutory design 
is frustrated. 
210. See 4 CCH CONSUMER. CREDIT GUIDE 11 30,740 (1971) (excerpts from Fed Res, 13d. 
opinion letter of Oct. 15, 1971, No. 528, by J. L. Robertson). 
211. See id. 11 30,778 (1972) (excerpts from Fed. Res. 13d. letter of Dec. 1971, No, 
557, by Griffith L. Garwood). 
212. Some issuers, particularly small ones such as department stores, do not have 
systematic reissuance programs. Misstatements of liability for these issuers arc likely 
to endure. Even in cases in which the issuer follows a yearly renewal program, cards 
that incorrectly state cardholder liability may have continued in circulation for two 
and one-half years after the effective date of the new statutory liability provisions, 
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impose cardholder liability only if it desires to preserve that right. 
The determinant of the availability of information to the cardholder 
is the issuer's assessment of the desirability of preserving an option· 
to impose limited liability. Notably, this calculus does not neces-
sarily bear any direct relation to the cardholder's need for informa-
tion. Even in situations where the law provides that no portion of 
an unauthorized charge may be assessed against him, the cardholder 
needs this information in order to adjust his response to the fraudu-
lent use of his card. 
The goal of preventing unnecessary cardholder responses may be 
achieved without the participation of all issuers in the disclosure 
scheme. Knowledge of the statute acquired from one issuer's dis-
closure can be applied to situations involving other issuers. But a 
number of conditions must first be present. Most importantly, a 
great number of issuers would have to disclose the required infor-
mation in a form indicating the general applicability of the liability 
rules. Furthermore, by virtue of the structure of the disclosure sys-
tem, issuers who choose to deliver the required information have no 
reason to indicate that the cardholder would have had no liability 
if the disclosure had not been made. Thus, when cardholders receive 
a statement about the applicability of the statute, it will be framed 
only in terms of a positive identification of liability. There is no 
incentive for an issuer to identify the extent to which its announced 
liability rules are applicable to transactions involving the cards of 
other issuers. In light of these factors and the absence of a uniform 
disclosure form, a cardholder may not recognize the applicability 
of the statutory controls to credit cards generally. 
The presence of credit card arrangements that are silent about 
the liability rules applicable in the event of misuse continues the 
risk of unnecessary cardholder action and expense. A minor modifica-
tion of the statutory provision can ensure that this risk is substan-
tially alleviated. Each issuer should be required to inform cardholders 
of the liability rules that apply in the event of an unauthorized 
transaction. Thus, issuers who choose not to preserve the option of 
imposing limited liability would be required to explicitly inform 
the cardholder that no adverse economic consequences result from 
the misuse of his card. It is assumed that many issuers would oppose 
such a disclosure because of a fear of encouraging laxity among card-
holders in the care of cards, and out of concern for the loss that might 
occur if cardholders failed to inform them of the loss of a card. Such 
an attitude by issuers may be quite desirable as a policy matter: 
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these are the concerns that Congress assumed would operate to 
prompt issuers to preserve their right to impose limited liability 
and to disseminate information about the statute. Only if issuers 
are made to confront these pressures directly is the statute likely to 
operate in accordance with the apparent congressional design. Rather 
than risk cardholder carelessness in card use, issuers would take 
advantage of the opportunity to create an economic incentive for the 
desired cardholder care by fulfilling the requisites for the imposition 
of limited liability.213 
D. The Effect of State Statutes and Cardholder Agreements 
on Cardholder Liability 
In a provision added during the floor debate, the new federal 
credit card law provides that the amount of cardholder liability will 
be governed by any "other applicable law or ... agreement with 
the card issuer" that sets liability at less than fifty dollars.214 This 
invitation to look for liability limitations in other sources is likely 
to have limited practical impact. But in a few situations in which 
other limitations are applicable, potentially complex interpretive 
problems may obfuscate the desired objective of readily ascertainable 
liability limits. 
Several issuers have long observed the practice of stating a speci-
fic dollar limitation on cardholder liability in the cardholder agree-
ment. The liability ceilings, however, have generally been higher 
than the maximum established by the federal enactment.21u Industry 
representatives commenting on S. 721, while generally receptive to 
the concept of a liability limitation, questioned the effectiveness of 
a fifty-dollar ceiling and urged adoption of a greater amount.210 
213. Of course, if a disclosure of nonliability were compelled, some cardholders who 
have no liability at present would therefore be exposed to the potential fifty-dollar 
liability as issuers chose instead to comply with the statutory requirements for recovery, 
In practice, however, these issuers are not likely to enforce their rights to receive reim-
bursement. In any case, a judgment might properly be made that cardholders should 
not be left without adequate information about the statute, the result that is per• 
petuated under present law. 
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(c) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. See 116 CoNc. REc. 11830 
(1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). 
215. Examples of liability limits imposed by several companies arc American Ex-
press Co.-$100, cited in Macaulay, supra note 136, at 1114 &: Bergsten, supra note 2, 
at 504; Diners' Club-$100, cited in Bergsten, id.; Shell Oil Co.-$100, cited in 1970 
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 225, 226 (submission of W. J. Bittles, Jr., General 
Manager of Retail Marketing, Shell Oil Co.). 
216. See 1970 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 225, 227 (submission of W. J. 
Bittles, Jr., General Manager of Retail Marketing, Shell Oil Co., urging a $100 ceil-
ing); 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 103, 106 (statement of Thomas Bailey, 
August 1972] Federal Control of Credit Cards 1539 
Absent a significant change in fraud loss experience, it is doubtful 
that issuers would now move to a lower self-imposed limit. 
A few states have adopted statutory limitations on cardholder 
liability.217 The majority of these will have little effect because the 
dollar amount specified either equals or exceeds that of the federal 
statute.218 Yet, in some of the situations in which a state enactment 
might control allocation of liability, the lower limitation is qualified 
so as to add a new level of complexity to the determination of card-
holder rights. Under the Illinois statute, for example, the cardholder's 
maximum liability increases with the greater reliability of the issuer's 
identification technique. Cardholder liability cannot exceed twenty-
five dollars in situations where the issuer has failed to provide a 
American Bankers Association, urging a $100 ceiling); id. at 123, 125, 127 (statement of 
Edward J. McNeal, American Retail Federation). But see 118 CoNG. REc:. 11830 (1970) 
(remarks of Senator Proxmire, reporting a $25 ceili~g applied by a ''large New York 
bank''). 
217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.20 (West Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, 
§ 382 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3927 (Supp. 1972); 
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12E(3) (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325.932 (Supp. 
1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:IOA-3 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-19-4 {Supp. 
1971); N.Y. GEN. Bus. I.Aw § 512(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CoDE ANN. 
§ 51.14.1-02 (Supp. 1971); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-15-117 (Supp. 1971). 
A number of state statutes absolve the intended cardholder of liability for the 
unauthorized use of an unsolicited credit card before his acceptance or use of it. See, 
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.209 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2542 (Supp. 1970); 
HAWAII REv. LAws § 730-12 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-618 (Supp. 1971): MD. 
ANN. Co»E art. 83, § 21B (1969); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1319.01 (Anderson Supp. 
1971); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 54;-11-4 (Supp. 1972); VA. CoDE ANN. § 11-31 (Supp. 
1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.71 (Supp. 1972). 
The federal statute achieves the same result, for a cardholder bears no liability 
for an unauthorized use unless his card is an "accepted credit card," 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. See text accompanying note 120 supra. 
Under the federal statute, a holder of an unsolicited, but accepted, card could have 
liability up to fifty dollars in the event of its unauthorized use. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) 
(1970), set out in note 34 supra. The statute. does not make .it explicit that this 
limited liability applies only to unsolicited cards issued prior to the effective date of 
the prohibition of unsolicited mailings. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
It can be argued that the definition of "accepted credit card" was intended only to 
validate unsolicited cards outstanding at the time of enactment. Cards subsequently 
issued in violation of the statute might be viewed as creating illegal contracts that are 
not enforceable for any purpose. Withou~ such a rule, an issuer might be tempted . to 
make an unsolicited distribution in the expectation that the cards would quickly be 
"accepted," thus gaining an advantage the statute seeks to deny. A Rhode Island 
statute that prohibits the mailing of unsolicited cards confronts this problem directly 
by precluding the issuer "from maintaining any civil action for the recovery of any 
debt created through the use of' an unsolicited card. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6-30-4 
(Supp. 1971). . 
218. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3927 (Supp. 1972) ($50); MAss. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 255, § 12E(3) (Supp. 1971) ($50); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.932 (Supp. 1972) 
($50); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:lOA-3 (Supp. 1972) ($50); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-19-4 (Supp. 
1971) ($50); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 512(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (incorporates federal 
limit); N.D. CENT. CODE .ANN.§ 51.14.1-02 (Supp. 1971) ($100). 
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signature panel on the card.219 However, since under the federal 
statute a means of identifying the holder must be included on the 
credit card as a prerequisite to imposing limited liability,220 the 
Illinois statute will prevail only until the federal statute is fully 
implemented.221 
The liability limitations in the California and Tennessee statutes 
have a more enduring effect. Both are significant because they re-
lieve the cardholder from all liability for unauthorized use if he 
promptly notifies the issuer of his loss.222 Although the apparent 
intent of the federal scheme was to abandon fault concepts in favor 
of a system of specifically defined liability,223 its deference to statutes 
such as those in California and Tennessee reintroduces the question 
of the quality of the cardholder's action. The California statute re-
quires nonnegligent conduct at two important stages: not only must 
notification be within a reasonable period of time after discovery 
of the loss, but the delay in the discovery must also not exceed that 
which "a reasonable man in the exercise of ordinary care" would 
have experienced.224 In addition to requiring prompt notification, 
the Tennessee provision absolves the cardholder of liability only if 
he "exercises reasonable care in [the] use and safekeeping" of his 
219. h.L. ANN. STAT, ch. 121½, § 382(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). Originany, a llablt-
ity ceiling of seventy-five doUars was provided if the card had a signature panel. [1967] 
Ill. Laws 365, § 2 Only 27, 1967). The graduated system of issuer liability was intended 
to encourage issuers to resort to more reliable identification techniques. The fifty-dollar 
ceiling of the federal statute took precedence, and the Illinois statute was amended by 
P.A. 77-1637, [1971) Ill. Laws 2580, § I (Sept. 24, 1971) to limit maximum liability to 
fifty dollars. 
New York had a provision with a graduated ceiling similar to the lllinois statute. 
See ch. 998, § 5 N.Y. Laws 3103, 3104-05 (May 19, 1970), In 1971, this was replaced by a 
measure incorporating the limitations of the federal statute, N.Y. GEN, Dus. LAW § 512 
(1) (McKinney Supp. 1971). 
220, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1970), set out in note 34 supra. 
221. The Illinois statute will only affect losses arising prior to Jan. 24, 1972, and 
then only if the cards involved were issued prior to the effective date of the federal 
statute. This result fol)ows because aU issuers desiring to impose any liability at all 
must provide some means of identification on the card. Cards newly issued after the 
effective date of the limited-liability provision, Jan. 24, 1971, must meet this standard, 
while cards that were outstanding on that date must meet the identification standard 
one year later. 36 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1971). The twenty-five-dollar limitation of the 
Illinois statute for cards with no means of identification will then be obsolete. 
222. See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1747.20 (West Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-15-117 
(Supp. 1971). If the cardholder fails to give the necessary notice, his liability cannot 
exceed fifty doUars under the California statute, The Tennessee enactment establishes 
a one hundred doUar liability ceiling if no notice is given. This limitation is no longer 
effective, and the cardholder's liability will be defined by the fifty dollar limitation of 
the federal statute. 
223. See text accompanying notes 187-92 supra. 
224. CAL. C1v. CoDE § 1747.20 (West. Supp. 1972). 
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card.225 The utilization of these flexible standards lessens the cer-
tainty of statutory application and increases both the cardholder's 
difficulty in assessing his liability and the issuer's opportunity for 
overreaching. The relatively small amount of liability involved, how-
ever, diminishes the significance of these consequences and, thus, 
the resultant disruption of the federal scheme. 
An unresolved question is whether the deference to state liability-
limiting rules extends to those arising from judicial interpretation. 
Several cases decided prior to the enactment of the federal statute 
developed the doctrine that a merchant had an obligation to exercise 
care in accepting a credit card. 226 Thus, the cardholder was relieved 
of liability for unauthorized purchases if the merchant failed to 
question the identity or authority of the user when circumstances 
suggested the appropriateness of such an inquiry.227 Injection of this 
rule into the federal statutory scheme would further relieve card-
holders of responsibility for unauthorized uses of their cards. What is 
uncertain, however, is whether "other applicable law," as embodied 
in the federal enactment, encompasses judicially pronounced rules. 
Debate about the breadth of statutory incorporation of other 
"law" has considerable historic significance, for this issue was at the 
center of the controversy concerning the law to be applied by federal 
judges in actions based solely on diversity of citizenship. The pre-
vailing resolution, announced in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,228 
is that a statutory reference to "the laws of the several states" en-
compasses both legislative and judicial pronouncements; yet, many 
courts indicate a continuing willingness to conclude that in constru-
ing a particular statute purporting to incorporate state laws, only 
legislative acts were intended to be incorporated. Legislative history, 
225. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-15-117 (Supp. 1971). 
226. See Duke v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 433 S.W .2d 919 (Te.x. Civ. App. 1968); Union 
Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960); Allied Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Fupder-
burke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (New York City Ct. 1967). See also Gulf Ref. Co. 
v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W .2d 790 (1945). See generally Note, 43 
N.C. L. R.Ev. 416 (1965); Recent Case, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 266 (1960). 
227. Inquiry was found to be necessary when an unusually large number of pur-
chases were made on the account in a short period of time. See Allied Stores of N.Y., 
Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc, 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (New York City Ct. 1967); Duke 
v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 433 S.W .2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Inquiry was also required 
when there was a discrepancy between the state of the cardholder's residence as printed 
on the card and the state of registration of the car for which petroleum products were 
purchased. Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960). 
228. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In question was the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
providing "that the laws of the several states ••• shall be regarded as rules of decision 
in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 
28 u.s.c. § 725 (1970). 
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policy, and the contextual implications of a usage are frequently 
employed to support the finding of such a limitation.220 
Application of these guides to the federal credit card statute 
suggests that only legislative enactments should be applied as further 
limitations of cardholder liability. In introducing the amendment 
that gave controlling effect to "other applicable law,'' Senator Prox-
mire observed that the bill was designed to accommodate state action 
"intended to go beyond the Federal legislation and reduce the con-
sumer's liability to less than $50.''280 While he did not indicate 
specifically that he contemplated only legislative action, his remarks 
were in the context of a discussion of existing state enactments, 
suggesting that he understood the primary impact of the amendment 
to be its incorporation of state statutory limitations. Also, the amend-
ment sought to ensure that the new statute, intended to advance 
consumer protection, did not actually increase the cardholder lia-
bility othenvise governed by more favorable loss-distribution mech-
anisms.281 The hearings suggest that the prevailing understanding 
was that such mechanisms took the form of either statutory or con-
tractual limitations.232 Consequently, it appears that the proponents 
of the amendment had only these two types of restrictions in mind 
when they moved for its enactment. 
The congressional design for the new loss-distribution scheme 
also supports the view that a merchant's negligence should not pro-
vide a further limitation on cardholder liability. Prior to the statute, 
the decision to shift liability from the cardholder to the issuer as a 
consequence of a merchant's negligence could be justified in order 
to stimulate issuers to ensure that merchants exercised care in ac-
cepting credit cards. Since control of this type of loss more clearly 
rested on the issuer than the cardholder, it seemed appropriate that 
229. See In re Chicago Express, Inc., 332 F.2d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Am• 
mond v. Pennsylvania R.R., 125 F.2d 747 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 691 (1942); 
Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., 121 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 
686 (1941); Neff v. Hindman, 77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1948). 
230. 116 CONG. REc. 11830 (1970). 
231. Id. 
232. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 66 (statement of Robert Meade, 
Director, President's Committee on Consumer Interests); id. at 106-07 (statement of 
Thomas Bailey, American Bankers Association); id. at 127 (discussion between Edward 
J. McNeal, American Retail Federation, and Senator Proxmire), Discussions of existing 
liability limitations typically included references only to state statutes and cardholdcr 
agreements. E.g., id. at 66 (Massachusetts statute); id. at 106 (New York statute); id. 
at 127 (Illinois statute). Judicially developed restrictions were not generally considered. 
This was probably due in part to the limited number of decisions supporting such 
limitations and the uncertainty of their impact. 
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the issuer bear the costs of these transactions.233 The enactment of 
the federal credit card statute removes much of the force of this 
justification since the issuer now bears the major responsibility for 
fraud losses in any case. The prospect of liability for all unauthorized 
charges in excess of fifty dollars should provide an adequate stimulant 
for the issuer to take the steps that the prestatutory negligence rules 
sought to promote. 
Some doubt must remain as to the meaning of the incorporation 
provision because the particular language used is broad, enough to 
encompass a limiting law in any form. It seems preferable, however, 
to accept the implications of the circumstances surrounding adoption 
of the amendment. If only legislative acts were incorporated, another 
potentially troublesome fault concept would be ·avoided with an 
accompanying reduction in both the likelihood of protracted con-
troversy and the need for professional interpretation. While this 
approach may deny the cardholder an important weapon for avoid-
ing the fifty-dollar liability in particular cases, such a result can be 
accepted as a necessary consequence of the effort to establish a new 
system of specific liability limitations.284 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When Congress set out to reform the credit card industry, its 
primary concern was with the implications of unsolicited distribu-
tion of such devices. The initial legislative proposals w'ere concerned 
only with this practice, and the hearings gave only limited attention 
to other issues. This is unfortunate because the other provisions of 
the enactment-particularly those limiting cardholder · liability-
will require much attention in their interpretation and application. 
A more complete statement of the legislative understanding would 
233. The fact that few issuers attempted to pass fraud losses on to individual card-
holders limits the practical importance of this argument. The suggested justification, 
however, does serve to explain those few cases in which merchant negligence was uti-
lized as a loss-allocation principle. 
234. Another aspect of the legislative history of S. 721 is relevant to the role of 
issuer or merchant negligence in accepting a card in an unauthorized use. A proposed 
modification in Committee would have required the issuer to inform the cardholder 
that "the card issuer or his agent has a responsibility to assure that purchases made on 
the card were made by the person identified on the card or a person authorized by 
him." S. REP. No. 739, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970). The reason for its rejection is not 
clear, since the Committee deliberations are not reported. However, the fact that Con-
gress apparently considered the idea that merchant negligence might further limit 
cardholder liability-and did not modify the statute to incorporate it-may support 
the inference that the statutory scheme was intended to operate without regard to the 
care that merchants exercised in accepting cards from unauthorized 'users. 
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have avoided some of the interpretive difficulties that the statute 
presents. 
. . In the absence of specific legislative direction, application of the 
statute' will require resort to general policies. The statutory design 
itself yields one. such principle. The liability limitation implicitly 
recognizes the need not only to restructure legal rules to protect 
consumers adequately, but also to ensure that consumers are given 
information that will enable them to utilize the protections pro-
vided. , Achievement of the goal of increasing consumer awareness 
requires also that particular attention be given to the substance of 
the new rules. An effort must be made to structure a loss-allocation 
system that can be conveyed in understandable form. Hence, the 
emphasis should be upon rules that carry readily discernible implica-
tions.l ,Does the federal credit card legislation have this quality? A 
basic premise of this Article is that there are a number of features of 
the statute-the reliance on agency concepts, the reference to the 
cardholder benefit in the definition of unauthorized use, the un-
defined role of cardholder negligence-that have a potential for 
interpretive complexity. 
Cases raising these interpretive problems should be resolved in 
a manner promoting consumer certainty by drawing clear distinc-
tions between circumstances that give rise to full liability and those 
to which the limited-liability provisions of the statute are applicable. 
In' so d~ing, traditional legal principles of construction may occa-
sio~!11ly be slighted, but this result must be accepted as a necessary 
effect of the commitment to make the law more sensitive to the con-
cern o~ a, consuming public. 
